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ABSTRACT

LES PAS PERDUS: IMAGES OF FEET AND SHOES IN SURREALIST ART

Emily Patricia Asplund
Department of French and Italian
Master of Arts

Although feet and shoes appear throughout surrealist visual art, their significance
within surrealist theory has not been studied as thoroughly as other familiar themes of
surrealist art, such as the eye or the hat. The purpose of this project is to recover feet and
shoes from their lowly position and to uncover their meaning and function in surrealist
theory, particularly the theory of Georges Bataille. Feet were implicitly important to
surrealists like André Breton and Louis Aragon, whose early and central literary texts
were based on their favorite pastime: flânerie or wandering the streets of Paris. Images of
feet can play a role in Bataille’s aim of flattening moral hierarchies, specifically the
binary hierarchy of elevated/base that is figured in the horizontal orientation of the
human body. Shoes can figure the loss of the self, because the peculiar intimacy of their
relation with the body blurs the boundary of perceiving subject and perceived object; in
this way, shoes as represented in surrealist art can flatten the epistemological hierarchy of
subject/object.
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Introduction

When Fredric Jameson set out to describe the coupure between modernism and
postmodernism, or more accurately to inquire whether such a shift even exists, he started
out with pictures of shoes. His study, Postmodernism or The Cultural Logic of Late
Capitalism, is a broad and also profound analysis of the question of postmodernism that
rests on the thesis that “postmodern culture is the internal and superstructural expression
of a whole new wave of American military and economic domination throughout the
world” (6). His vast study takes on film and architecture, utopian theories and
navigational methods, modern British literature and the structure of the novel in
Eisenhower America, late capitalist economics and Continental philosophy—but he
chooses for his initial and most focused illustration of the shift from modernism to
postmodernism a painting of an empty pair of worn boots by Van Gogh and a photograph
of a row of mismatched shoes by Warhol (see fig. 1.1). The two works are useful as
illustrations of the coupure because of their similar subjects, which allow Jameson to
isolate their stylistic and formal differences. The contrast between Van Gogh‟s
expressive oil painting and Warhol‟s cool photograph demonstrates the features of
postmodern culture: its lack of affect or expressivity, its indifference and even hostility
toward the viewer, its fundamental lack of depth.
Another picture of shoes is included in the book and briefly mentioned in the text:
René Magritte‟s Le modèle rouge (see fig. 1.2). This painting was a popular surrealist
icon in the 1930s, and its subject matter and composition link it to the other two works. It
was painted almost exactly halfway between Van Gogh‟s work in 1886 and Warhol‟s
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work in 1980. It seems perfectly situated to serve as a reference for triangulation, to
further elucidate the shift from high modernism to postmodernism by fleshing out
surrealism‟s role in that coupure, which after all did not happen in one fell swoop.
Jameson, however, chooses to mention Magritte‟s shoe-feet only in passing. One thing
Jameson does say about Magritte is that he was “unique among the surrealists” because
he “survived the sea change from the modern to its sequel” with the prevalence in his
paintings of “the uncanny, Lacanian foreclusion, without expression” (10). But this
might be another way of saying that in Magritte‟s image of shoes we can detect a moment
of transformation from modernism to postmodernism, and the image does seem to
contain aspects of modernism while at the same time pointing towards postmodernism.
Magritte‟s shoe-feet are one of a large number of surrealist works that feature
shoes and feet as their subject matter. We can plausibly and tentatively group these
surrealist foot and shoe images with Warhol‟s Diamond Dust Shoes and other
postmodern productions because, as I want to argue in this project, they figure the loss of
the self, and this is an important facet of postmodernism, as Jameson describes it. “Those
canonical experiences of radical isolation and solitude, anomie, private revolt, Van Goghtype madness” that “dominated the period of high modernism” all have a subject at their
center—the homunculus in Munch‟s Scream or the absent but implied wearer of Van
Gogh‟s lonely shoes (14). Modern art is concerned with expressing emotion or ideas, and
this implies depth, an inside layer of psyche that has something to say, and an outside
world where the expression appears and that may or may not perceive it.
Postmodernism, among other things, is a flattening out of this depth through the
death of the subject. This is why Warhol‟s shoes are a group of singles, not a matched
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pair like Van Gogh‟s (Derrida commented, somewhere, that they are a heterosexual pair,
according to Jameson, 8). Warhol‟s shoes are not waiting to be worn; they are perhaps
waiting to be bought, or are nothing more than exemplars for the real commodities that
are waiting to be bought, or else they are not waiting for anything—they are nothing
more than a photographic negative. Unlike Van Gogh‟s shoes that tell their wearer‟s
story, Jameson doubts whether Warhol‟s shoes speak at all (8). In any case, there is no
wearer implied, no absent subject to fill out and inspire these objects. Van Gogh‟s shoes
do imply this kind of absent subject, as Heidegger‟s analysis of them in “On the Origin of
the Work of Art” insists. These shoes are modern because they have an inside, and
moreover they have an empty inside; they are full of the anomie and anxiety and
alienation of their absent subject, and these emotions are sufficient stand-ins for the
modern subject. The modern subject is even expressive in its absence.
Magritte‟s shoes are an interesting middle point between these two examples of
high modernism and broad postmodernism. They resemble Warhol‟s shoes in that they
are also not waiting to be worn: they contain their own feet. But they also contain a
subject and an object, even if the two are fused together, and in this way they preserve the
modernist sense of an inside and an outside. There is this suggestion of a depth model
that Jameson would say is characteristic of modernity, but in these shoe-feet, that depth is
in the process of being flattened; the hidden or inside member of the shoe/foot pair is
gradually emerging, pushing itself through the outside mask—or else the outside surface
is slowly fading to reveal what is inside. Or else they were interchangeable to begin with,
and the depth models of modernism were illusory after all. It is possible that in
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Magritte‟s image we can witness the first steps away from modernism and onto flatter
terrain.
Jameson‟s purpose in Postmodernism is not just to identify or demonstrate
elements of the postmodern but also to offer a “periodizing hypothesis,” to explain how it
is possible to identify a movement like postmodernism in the first place (5). Indeed, he
asserts that “all isolated or discrete cultural analysis always involves a buried or repressed
theory of historical periodization,” and his is more a “genealogy” of periods than a linear
history (2). By inserting Magritte‟s shoe-feet in between Van Gogh‟s and Warhol‟s own
shoes we can add another generation to the family history of postmodernism, giving us a
more complete picture of the growth and evolution of postmodern culture.
Although the focus of this project will not be to establish surrealism as a
foundational or originary form of postmodernism, its characterization of the surrealist
movement (particularly Georges Bataille‟s version of it) as primarily concerned with the
dialectical overcoming of binary structure should show its link to the flatness of
postmodernism that Jameson describes. Feet and shoes play a central role in this
flattening project when we take into account Bataille‟s analysis of them. In 1929
Georges Bataille, the surrealist author and theorist, began the project of writing a
surrealist dictionary in his influential but short-lived journal Documents (Hollier, Against
Architecture 78). The purpose of this dictionary, however, was not to give the definitions
of words that related to surrealist thought, but rather to isolate their job, their function
(Bataille, “Formless” 39). He wrote entries for terms such as architecture and formless,
but also for body parts—mouth, eye, and the big toe. The entry for this last body part
was not published in the journal, perhaps because the photographic illustrations for it,
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made by Jacques-André Boiffard, were too large and frankly hideous. Already Bataille‟s
project of a dictionary that gives a word‟s function rather than its meaning heralds the
postmodern taste for theories of meaning that locate meaning in systems of relations of
signs rather than in some one-to-one relation between signifier and signified. But
Bataille‟s analysis of the human foot flattens modernist structures of meaning even
further, locating the defining characteristic of humans in the foot rather than the head.
What Bataille is seeking in much of his writing, and what the inversion of our
habitual hierarchies of thought (head/foot) is meant to achieve, is a loss of the self. Here
is another explicit similarity between the surrealist project and Jameson‟s vision of
postmoderniem, because the “eclipse of subjectivity” is one of the most characteristic
features of postmodern art (174). The postmodern loss of the subject is total flatness, not
a mere repression or “puritanical extinction” of the subject (174). Surrealism, especially
Bataille‟s version of it with its focus on the loss of the self through ritual and sacrifice,
but also Breton‟s search for the intoxication of the merveilleux, similarly wishes to
extinguish the subject, and not as a kind of expiation or self-denial, but in an act of
revelation, tearing away the illusory mask of the subject or the ego that was erected by
traditional philosophy and morality. Images of feet and shoes achieve this; they
challenge our ideas about beauty, purity, and propriety, and even our notions of our own
bodily architecture.
Where surrealism would fail to qualify as postmodern, at least where it would fail
Jameson‟s test, is in its commitment to the ultimately teleological character of dialectic.
The death of the subject in postmodern culture, according to Jameson, results in “an
impersonal collective subject, without the charge and investment either of a personal
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Unconscious or of a group one… „surrealism‟ without its manifesto or its avant-garde”
(174-5). Surrealism retains the ideas of linear, historical succession (its sense of itself as
belonging to an avant-garde) and Marxist, revolutionary intention (its manifesto) that, for
Jameson, mark the modernist period. Jameson says that:
The Utopian vocation of surrealism lies in its attempt to endow the object
world of a damaged and broken industrial society with the mystery and the
depth, the „magical‟ qualities…of an Unconscious that seems to speak and
vibrate through those things. (173)
Jameson‟s point here is that postmodernism lacks the depth of an unconscious; in fact,
he‟s arguing that postmodern art is “surrealism without the unconscious.” He says that
modernist photography and painting see their task as a “redemption of physical reality”
(he is quoting Kracauer, 173). Postmodern visual art has left behind painting‟s “older
(modernist) Utopian vocations: it is no longer to do anything beyond itself” (173). It
loses the “ideological missions” that modernist painting proposed for itself. He implies
that the “uncontrolled kinds of figuration” we see in surrealist art are hallucinatory, and
thus point to an unconscious, a depth either of the individual subject or of a collective
subject (174).
Surrealist art does, in fact, have a goal, a telos, and ultimately this telos is
Utopian: le surréalisme au service de la révolution. Its method for inciting revolution is,
with Breton certainly, to unearth the unconscious through chance encounters and unusual
juxtapositions of images and words. But Bataille‟s approach is different from Breton‟s,
and this, along with his explicit references to shoes and feet, is why this project is
centered on Bataille‟s renegade surrealism rather than Breton‟s canonical surrealism.
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Bataille‟s concept of the informe, the category of thought in which all categories
disappear, is an intermediary point between Breton‟s intoxicated merveilleux and
postmodernism‟s lack of ideological missions. I will try to argue that the foot/shoe pair,
seen through the lens of Bataille‟s theory, evokes a true loss of the subject in a relation of
sacrifice with an object that becomes part of itself and is thus always cast away from
itself. Socio-political, Utopian ends tend to fade into the background in this radical
version of surrealism.
Jameson left out Magritte‟s shoes, and they were a crucial step in between the
affective and hermeneutic depth of Van Gogh‟s shoes and the flatness of Warhol‟s. A
lost step, in fact; a pas perdu. I am leaving much out of this study: theories of dress and
adornment; gender issues; shoes as commodities; print culture and the close connection
between the preferred texts of fashion and of surrealism, i.e. the magazine; sexual and
Freudian connotations of shoes and feet; theories of the postnatural body. These will all
have to be addressed in some future project. For now I want to begin by discussing the
way feet and shoes might function within surrealist theory, specifically the radical
dialectic surrealism of Georges Bataille.
The purpose of this project is to examine images of feet and shoes in surrealist art
in order to situate these objects within surrealist thought; in other words, to find out what
was their job or function. The first chapter will begin with a general discussion of the
foot‟s most basic role in surrealism: the vehicle for flânerie. Then it will attempt to justify
its thematic approach with regard to other academic work on surrealism. The second
chapter will move to a more specific examination of the role of feet within the goal of
surrealist art, which according to Bataille was to eliminate categories of thought in the
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viewer by portraying bassesse. The final chapter will turn to shoes and their peculiar
relation with feet; it will attempt to show that by virtue of the unique and intimate relation
of foot and shoe, images of shoes in surrealist art have the function of representing the
loss of self.
Ultimately, this project is not much more than a collection of images that share a
common thematic element. But such a collection can be instructive, and hopefully
interesting. In his Arcades project, Benjamin discusses the difference between an
allegorist and a collector. In a fragment titled “The collector as allegorist” he says that
“What is decisive in collecting is that the object is detached from all its original functions
in order to enter into the closest conceivable relation to things of the same kind” (207).
The collector brings things together that she believes belong together by virtue of their
properties and relations. The allegorist, on the other hand, dislodges things from their
context and relies on her own profundity to illuminate their meaning (207). What I want
to try to do in this project is be a collector rather than an allegorist, or at least to show
how the surrealists collected shoes and feet in their art. I will furthermore try to discuss
the properties and relations of shoes that might have led the surrealists in their social and
theoretical context to collect them in the first place; these shoes and feet will be, like the
objects Aragon and Breton encounter during their wanderings through the urban
landscape, taken not as symbols or outgrowths of ideas, but as ideas themselves.

Chapter 1
First Steps

Any examination of shoes in European art in the early 20th century must begin with
Van Gogh‟s well-known painting of 1886 of a pair of rough, worn out boots (fig. 1.1).
The painting is famous in its own right as well as for being discussed by Heidegger in his
1935 lecture on aesthetics, later published as the essay “The Origin of the Work of Art.”
In this essay Heidegger refers to the painting in order to demonstrate the essence of art,
which he believes is (to simplify the matter greatly) to unconceal the essence or truth of
being. So this painting of an old pair of boots reveals something about what boots are,
that in which their being consists. The painting does not show us any particular pair of
shoes; we could only come to know the essence of any one pair of shoes by walking a
mile in them, since “The peasant woman wears her shoes in the field. Only here are they
what they are” (Heidegger 159). The painting contains no specific details that would
contextualize or particularize the shoes. It is a painting of “A pair of peasant shoes and
nothing more. And yet…” (Heidegger 159).
The painting is not about a particular pair of shoes, but rather it is about what it
means to be a shoe, and furthermore, it is about what it means to be a shoe within a
certain world of relations with other objects and people. The painting does something
remarkable, according to Heidegger. It is able to evoke the world in which a pair of
shoes such as these could function:
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Figure 1.1. Vincent van Gogh, A Pair of Shoes, 1886. Van Gogh Foundation, Amsterdam; rpt. in Pascal
Bonafoux, Van Gogh (New York, 1990) 59.
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From the dark opening of the worn insides of the shoes the toilsome tread
of the worker stares forth. In the stiffly rugged heaviness of the shoes
there is the accumulated tenacity of her slow trudge through the farspreading and ever-uniform furrows of the field swept by a raw wind. On
the leather lie the dampness and richness of the soil. Under the soles
stretches the loneliness of the field-path as evening falls. In the shoes
vibrates the silent call of the earth, its quiet gift of the ripening grain and
its unexplained self-refusal in the fallow desolation of the wintry field.
This equipment is pervaded by uncomplaining worry as to the certainty of
bread, the wordless joy of having once more withstood want, the
trembling before the impending childbed and shivering at the surrounding
menace of death. This equipment belongs to the earth, and it is protected
in the world of the peasant woman. (159-60)
This is what a work of art does, according to Heidegger: it calls up a world of meaning.
Never mind that the shoes were actually Van Gogh‟s, bought in a flea market in Arles
and worn every day on his tramps through the village and the countryside (Bonafoux 58).
What Heidegger‟s analysis addresses is the context of concerns in which Van Gogh made
this painting, the world of social and economic relationships in which Van Gogh lived
and made his art.
Heidegger rightly emphasizes in his analysis the notion that these are peasant
shoes we are looking at, with all that implies. The world that Van Gogh‟s shoes opens up
was a world where social hierarchies were beginning to collapse and the lives of peasants
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began to matter. Van Gogh had been influenced by artists in Paris who were beginning
to explore social issues in their work. Paintings of simple field workers by Millet had
shocked Paris gallery visitors because they were great paintings whose subjects were not
aristocrats or characters from Christian or classical mythology but ordinary peasants.
The Revolution of 1848 brought about a concomitant revolution in the Paris art world, as
a group of artists gathered in Barbizon and began to look at nature with a new respect and
awe.1 Francois Millet was part of this group, and he decided to extend to figurative
painting the new democratic attitude toward landscapes that was developing in France,
inspired by British painters like Turner. His famous painting The Gleaners was made in
1857 and established him as part of the new Realist movement, of which Gustave
Courbet was the self-proclaimed leader. These paintings of ordinary people in natural
poses ran counter to the more traditional approach to figurative art, whose proponents
were shocked by the casualness and sincerity of these paintings as well as by their vulgar
subjects.
The social changes in 19th century Europe had a generally leveling effect and
were mirrored in this new choice of subject matter by artists, who sought to elevate
members of the lower classes by painting them not solely in genre studies but in great
works of art. Millet lavished on a small group of gleaners the care usually taken only for
nobles or gods. A generation later, Van Gogh moved to the South of France, directly
inspired by Millet and his social message, to paint rustic landscapes and subjects. In
Heidegger‟s terms, Van Gogh intended to unconceal in his art the world of the peasant.

1

See E.H. Gombrich, The Story of Art, Phaidon, 1989.
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Still another generation later, shoes began to make another appearance in the
visual arts. By the time the surrealist movement was in full swing in Paris, from the mid1920s to the 1930s, the democratization of subject matter in the visual arts was complete.
Everyday objects were central themes for the surrealists, and feet and shoes were
portrayed in some iconic works of the period. One image of shoes from this era suggests
itself here. Magritte‟s Le modèle rouge painted originally in 1935 was an iconic image
for the surrealists; it was reproduced in a number of media (shop windows, on the cover
of an issue of Minotaure) and was commercially successful (fig. 1.2).2
The surrealist project unconcealed a world entirely different from Van Gogh‟s.
Another fifty years after Van Gogh‟s time in Arles, when rural areas were emptying out
in earnest as the kinds of laborers Millet and Van Gogh painted were rushing into urban
centers to find work, the question of what it could mean to be a peasant had completely
changed for the Paris artists and intellectuals. The Marxist movement, whose theories
had been developed in that earlier generation, was now, in the first few decades of the
20th century, focused on the true underclass of high capitalism, the urban factory worker,
as well as the modern world‟s other citizen-victims—the commodity, the alienated
middle class, the body. The characters who populated the urban landscape were no
longer peasants in the traditional sense; the modern peasant was Aragon‟s Paysan de
Paris, a flâneur whose feet trod the passages and boulevards of Paris instead of the farspreading furrows.

2

The painting was so commercially successful that Magritte‟s dealer urged him to
complete more like it: “Do not worry about doing business; I will do that for you the
moment I have paintings on a par with The Red Model” (Papanikolas 69).
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Figure 1.2. René Magritte, Le modèle rouge, 1937; rpt. in Magritte and Contemporary Art: The Treachery
of Images, Stephanie Barron and Michel Draguet eds. (LACMA, 2006) 69.
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Flâneurs
Since Bakunin, Europe has lacked a radical concept of freedom. The Surrealists have one.
Benjamin, “Surrealism” 215

Wandering through the streets of Paris was more than a pastime for the
surrealists; it was a metaphor for their theory, a model for their way of thinking. Two
central surrealist texts, Louis Aragon‟s Paysan de Paris and Andre Breton‟s Nadja, are
essentially accounts of various wanderings through the streets of Paris and the people,
buildings, and objects met along the way. The workers and trades people walk through
the streets on their business; friends like Breton and Giacometti wander through flea
markets together, discussing ideas and finding inspiration in unwanted, unfashionable
objects; Breton and Nadja conduct their affair while strolling “les cent pas dans le hall” at
the Gare Saint-Lazare and in other places in the city; prostitutes stroll through Aragon‟s
Passage de l‟Opera, having “simply graduated from sitting each day at the terraces of
neighboring cafes,” and the flâneurs, Aragon among them, prowl the passages after their
prey (Breton 713; Aragon 36).
Aragon was especially concerned with the state of wandering in a particular
neighborhood of Paris, one that was full of transients and artists, mistresses and
prostitutes, where hotel rooms were available by the hour or by the week and there were
bookstores that allowed customers to browse without buying. The passages were
commercial streets that had been covered in the middle of the 19th century with ironwork
and glass to form arcades, facilitating pedestrian travel through what eventually became
warrens of prostitution, artistic endeavor and political foment. Benjamin says that this
model for city planning, devised by Haussmann, “consisted of long straight streets
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opening onto broad perspectives” and that “this idea corresponds to the tendency—
common in the nineteenth century—to ennoble technological necessities through
spurious artistic ends” (“Paris, Capital of the Nineteenth Century” 24). Despite their
original purpose of preventing the kinds of barricades that Paris‟ narrow streets permitted
in 1830 and 1848, the passages eventually became home to a new generation of political
activists.
Aragon was one of them. In his novel Paysan de Paris he laments the impending
destruction of one of the passages, the Passage de l’Opera. The Passage de l‟Opera is
where one sees “the footsteps of mystery crossing those of whorishness,” and his favorite
path for wandering would soon be demolished to make way for the Boulevard
Haussmann (Aragon 20). Aragon worried this change in the urban landscape might have
the following effect:
…it seems possible…that a good part of the human river which carries
incredible floods of dreamers and dawdlers from the Bastille to the
Madeleine may divert itself through this new channel, and thus modify the
ways of thought of a whole district, perhaps of a whole world. We are
doubtless about to witness a complete upheaval of the established fashions
in casual strolling and prostitution, and it may well be that this
thoroughfare, which is bound to make the boulevards and the Quartier
Saint-Lazare far more easily accessible to each other, will see entirely new
types of person saunter along its pavements, hitherto unknown specimens
whose whole lives will hesitate between the two zones of attraction in
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which they are equally involved, and who will be the chief protagonists of
tomorrow‟s mysteries. (14-15)
It is significant that Aragon seems in one sense to be lamenting the demise of his
habitual pedestrian routes but in another sense to be almost indifferent and even curious
about the new experiences this change in traffic will bring about. The sense of restless
wandering is complete in Aragon; he does not wish to stop his wandering, and does not
even wish his paths of wandering to remain as they are. He is a flâneur in the strictest
sense, one who is constantly thirsty for new people and objects to watch, new
neighborhoods to discover, new streets to walk in. But it is even more significant that
Aragon sees in these passages the analogues, even the physical manifestations, of “the
ways of thought” of the people who inhabit them. For Aragon, walking through the
streets facilitates thinking, mirrors thinking, produces thinking, is thinking. If the product
of Van Gogh‟s peasant woman‟s long trudges through the fields is grain, then the product
of Aragon‟s long strolls through the passages is thought.
This idea of the freedom of walking is central to Breton‟s Nadja as well, as is the
identity of wandering and thought. The book is a record of “les episodes les plus
marquants de ma vie” (the most outstanding episodes of my life), but its narrative
structure mirrors that of these episodes themselves—“hors de son plan organique…dans
un monde comme défendu qui est celui des rapprochements soudains, des petrifiantes
coincidences, des reflexes primant tout autre essor du mental” (outside its organic
form…in an almost forbidden world, that of a sudden closeness, of petrifying
coincidences, of reflexes excluding any other mental flight) (651). The narrative, like
Breton, wanders. He meets Nadja on the street as both are wandering on the rue
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Lafayette, as “sans but je poursuivais ma route dans la direction de l‟Opéra” (I aimlessly
went my way towards the opera house) and Nadja is wandering in the opposite direction,
ostensibly going to the hairdresser, although her manner of attire suggests she was hoping
for just such a meeting (683).
Breton was ready for whatever experience might meet him as he walked through
the city, and this was both a literal practice and a metaphor for the kind of thinking that
was important for him. Nadja was written as “une série d‟observations de cet ordre” (a
series of this type of observation), that is observations about coincidence, seemingly
meaningless connections, like the optical illusion produced when one looks at the sign of
a hotel from a certain angle so that the word „rouge‟ appears as the word „police‟ (Breton
681). Breton‟s aim in writing about these random encounters was “précipiter quelques
hommes dans la rue, après leur avoir fait prendre conscience, sinon du néant, du moins de
la grave insuffisance de tout calcul soi-disant rigoureux sur eux-mêmes, de toute action
qui…a pu être prémeditée” (to send some men into the street after having made them
aware if not of nothingness then of the serious insufficiency of any so-called rigorous
calculation about themselves, of any action that…can have been premeditated) (681).
Breton wanted to wander through the streets of Paris, to see what he could see; and he
likewise wanted his narrative to wander, so it could perhaps awaken in his reader the
same “associations d‟idées suspectes” (associations of suspicious ideas) that his
wanderings did in his own mind (651).
This restless, peripatetic spirit forms the philosophical foundation of surrealism,
and it also represented for Breton his break from Dadaism. In his work, aptly named Les
pas perdus (Lost Steps), he describes various interactions with members of the Paris
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avant-garde and begins to sketch his first steps away from Dadism and onto the path of
surrealism. In an essay titled “Lâchez tout” he says that “le dadaïsme, comme tant
d‟autres choses, n‟a été pour certains qu‟une manière de s‟asseoir” (Dadaism, like so
many other things, was for certain individuals nothing more than a way to sit down); but
Breton didn‟t want to sit any more, he wanted to walk (263). He didn‟t want to give or
devote his life to any absolute idea, whether true or false, as he felt the Dadaists did. “Je
meurs si je m‟attache” (I die if I attach myself) (263). He felt that Dadaism was stagnant,
another way of taking oneself off of one‟s feet. What he wanted above all else was
philosophical freedom; the freedom to wander, to experience coincidences of thought, to
abandon reason. In Nadja he says “Je préfère…marcher dans la nuit à me croire celui qui
marche dans le jour” (I prefer to wander in the night than to believe myself someone who
walks in the daytime), and the darkness of unreason was his favorite place to find the
inspiration of unplanned encounters (681). This then is his battle cry: “Lâchez tout.
Lâchez Dada. Lâchez votre femme, lâchez votre maîtresse. Lâchez vos esperances et
vos craintes. Lâchez la proie pour l‟ombre. Lâchez au besoin une vie aisée, ce qu‟on
vous donne pour une situation d‟avenir. Partez sur les routes” (Let go of everything. Let
go of Dada. Let go of your wife, let go of your mistress. Let go of your hopes and your
fears. Leave the prey in favor of the shadow. Leave an easy life in favor of need, leave
what you are given for some future situation. Hit the road) (my emphasis, 263). For
Breton what distinguished surrealism as a theory and as a practice from Dadaism was that
it got up on its feet and walked away.
Francis Picabia tells Breton that “Il faut être nomade, traverser les idées comme
on traverse les pays ou les villes” (It is necessary to be a nomad, to travel through ideas
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just as you travel through countries or cities) (Breton 261). Aragon and Breton both saw
their wanderings through the city streets as closely linked to the wandering of their ideas
and thought. Ideas, like countries and cities, are, after all, ephemeral—at least the
surrealists believed they were. The surrealists, though they were at times broken into
factions, shared a desire to abandon the philosophical idealism they had inherited in favor
of materialism, in favor of what they could see and touch. And what they could see and
touch was the city and its streets. Ideas and cities were analogous for the surrealists; to
wander through a city, open to its architecture and its people, was also to wander through
ideas, free to think and then abandon whichever ones happened to present themselves.
Thus feet were important to the surrealists, even if their role is only implied by the
ceaseless wandering, through the city and through ideas, engaged in by these artists,
theorists, and flâneurs. Magritte‟s shoe-feet became iconic for the surrealists as well as
for those outside the movement; when he designed the cover for Minotaure in 1937
Magritte tucked his shoes into the bottom left corner (fig. 1.3); Marcel Duchamp
produced a pair of real shoe-feet for a bookstore window display for the publication of
Breton‟s Le surréalisme et la peinture in New York, since the painting had been chosen
as the cover art for the book (fig. 1.4); and the image was so resilient that Pierre Cardin
made a pair in 1986 (fig. 1.5). The image was emblematic of the movement, and it
seemed to strike a chord.3

3

The close interaction of the surrealist movement and the world of fashion is a
fascinating topic that has been discussed in the following works, among others: HallDuncan, Nancy. The History of Fashion Photography. New York: Alpine Book
Company, 1979; Martin, Richard. Fashion and Surrealism. New York: Rizzoli, 1987;
and Crawforth, Hannah. “Surrealism and the Fashion Magazine.” American Periodicals:
A Journal of History, Criticism, and Bibliography 14.2 (2004) 212-246.
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Figure 1.3. René Magritte, cover for Minotaure, December, 1937; rpt. in Marcel Jean, The History of
Surrealist Painting (New York, 1960) 241.
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Figure 1.4. Marcel Duchamp, Enrico Donati, Window Display, Brentano‟s, New York, 1945; rpt. in
Richard Martin, Fashion and Surrealism (New York: Rizzoli, 1987) 96.
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Figure 1.5. Pierre Cardin, Men's Shoes, 1986, Fashion Institute of Technololgy, New York; rpt. in Richard
Martin, Fashion and Surrealism (New York: Rizzoli, 1987) 97.
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Part of its appeal was likely its cheeky revision of Van Gogh‟s image. There is an
ironic awareness to Magritte‟s shoes of the new world they occupy, a world where they
no longer need to trudge through muddy fields; these shoes prowl the streets of Paris.
There is also a sense of disdain for the affective element of Van Gogh‟s image. In Van
Gogh‟s canvas, the ugliness and vulnerability, the lowliness of the shoes are immediately
visually accessible through the drab colors, the lack of shading, and the careless
brushstrokes. These shoes are tragic, but also cozy, cunning, sweet, looking up at us.
Their pliant, worn leather is an index of the time their owner, their absent subject, has
spent in the fields. Heidegger is right that their emptiness is evident—the black space
yawning out from them, their saggy, flaccid form, are both lamentation and invitation.
They look bereft of their feet and excited to be reunited with them, almost proud of the
hard work that is required of them. They wear their wear and tear like a badge. As a
romanticization and glorification of the 19th century peasant laborer, this pair of shoes
does the trick.
Magritte‟s shoes lack this affective facet. They are also empty, in a sense, but
they do not seem to be beckoning their wearer to put them on. They say something
different about their relationship with the feet that wear them; they are not abandoned,
empty husks waiting to be inhabited at last by a living subject. As products of and
participants in modern capitalist society, these shoes know that there is no separation
between them and their wearer. Magritte‟s boots are finer than Van Gogh‟s, less worn,
but only slightly; they are ordinary shoes, probably mass-produced. They are not
centered in the frame, as Van Gogh‟s are; instead of beckoning and inviting the missing
feet for whom they were made and to whom they belong, these empty shoes point an
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accusing toe at the absent body by leaving its place conspicuously empty. But the body
is not gone; it reasserts itself in the shoes themselves.
The surreal element of Magritte‟s painting lies in the toes that gradually take over
the bottom of the shoes, morphing the shoes into feet in a painting that is otherwise
markedly realistic. This part of the body, at least, has never left the shoes; unlike Van
Gogh‟s shoes, these have not been abandoned, because even in the absence of a wearer
they contain within themselves the part of the body that most concerns them. We might
perhaps see in these shoes the identity of the surrealist flâneur, whose shoes are his
vehicle and his tools, his only home in his wanderings. They carry his feet through the
streets of Paris, and since these wanderings are his “ways of thought,” these shoes are
also his vehicles of thought. Van Gogh‟s shoes make us feel the hard toil of the peasant;
Magritte‟s shoes make us think.

Things
Objects metamorphosed before my very eyes; they did not assume an allegorical stance or the
personality of symbols; they seemed less the outgrowths of an idea than the idea itself.
Louis Aragon, Le paysan de Paris

Magritte‟s shoes are emblematic of the importance of walking in surrealist
thought, but they also illustrate the surrealists‟ belief in the power of everyday objects to
inspire and instruct. Cities and the objects in them were not just like ideas for the
surrealists; they could also contain ideas and be ideas. Aragon‟s Paysan de Paris opens
with a discussion of the passages of the arcades, and specifically the Passage de l‟Opera,
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which was about to be demolished to make way for a straighter, American style of city
planning:
Although the life that originally quickened them has drained away, they
deserve, nevertheless, to be regarded as the secret repositories of several
modern myths: it is only today, when the pickaxe menaces them, that they
have at last become the true sanctuaries of a cult of the ephemeral, the
ghostly landscape of damnable pleasures and professions. Places that
were incomprehensible yesterday, and that tomorrow will never know.
(14)
Aragon saw that the ephemeral nature of the city had something to tell him. With this
insight he anticipated Walter Benjamin‟s critical historical method. These are places that
are made to be walked through; places where the transient are at home.
Aragon also shared with Benjamin the belief that the objects of everyday life can
be repositories of information by virtue of human interaction with them, human use of
them. In Le paysan de Paris he says that he had noticed that once people no longer
believed in mythologies, they novelized them. He wanted to do the reverse and write a
novel that would create a mythology of the modern by extracting it from the objects of
everyday life, which for him were contained in the streets of Paris. He describes how a
city can gradually take on a sacred quality:
Wherever the living pursue particularly ambiguous activities, the
inanimate may sometimes assume the reflection of their most secret
motives: and thus our cities are peopled with unrecognized sphinxes which
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will never stop the passing dreamer and ask him mortal questions unless
he first projects his meditation, his absence of mind, towards them. (13)
The “wise man” who endeavors to “interrogate” the objects that populate his world and
“guess their secret” is following Breton‟s command to let go of everything, hit the streets,
and leave himself open to real experience (Aragon 13). This is also the method Benjamin
followed in his critiques, and it is furthermore the purpose of my project, namely to
interrogate objects. More accurately, my project is about the ways the surrealists
interrogated a particular set of objects, and what answers those objects might have given
them.
This turn toward objects was a reaction against a philosophical tradition, and we
turn to Benjamin for a characterization of this tradition, the stasis Breton wanted to walk
away from. The surrealists, along with Benjamin, wanted to return to objects because
they felt the philosophical idealism that they had inherited was an illusion, and not a
benign one. Benjamin‟s critical method has been called immanent criticism; the purpose
of this kind of critique is to get at, to reveal truths about an era or a place through an
analysis of the material conditions of that era or place, as Richard Wolin explains in his
introduction to Benjamin‟s thought, Walter Benjamin: An Aesthetics of Redemption.
According to Wolin, Benjamin felt that neo-Kantian philosophy caused a fragmentation
of human experience that turned the modern world into a phantasmagoria. The newKantian‟s insistence on a distinction between the natural and social sciences, while
motivated by a desire to “rescue the concept of autonomous subjectivity from the
clutches of 19th century positivism,” also was responsible for the loss of meaning in
everyday experience (211). This Kantianism forbad any meanderings into the intelligible
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or supersensible realm, but this was precisely the realm in which Benjamin thought he
could find a superior, non-mundane concept of experience (Wolin 211).
Benjamin believed that by fragmenting human experience into the sensible and
the supersensible, modern philosophy impoverished our experience of everyday life and
eclipsed the sense of wholeness in experience (Wolin 212). This fragmentation had its
roots in what Benjamin believed was the original sin of human reason: trying to grasp the
non-conceptual by means of concepts, or in other words the sin of idealism and
reification. The only way to redeem modern experience was to return to a mode of
thought that resisted reification and thus was more faithful to real experience. Benjamin
wanted to think in images, because “the sensuousness of the image retained greater
affinities with the concrete character of lived experience itself” (Wolin 213). Cartesian
philosophy cluttered human experience with reified ideals, categories of thought that
most often took the form of hierarchical binaries: subject/object, knowable/unknowable,
mind/body. But Benjamin believed that powerful ideas could be uncovered in experience
that cannot be conceptualized or categorized, only experienced as an image. He therefore
tried to renounce conventional philosophical narrative in favor of an unmediated
juxtaposition of insights, thereby giving voice to things themselves (Wolin 213). He
wanted to redeem experience through a return to material objects; “Truth was to emerge
from an unmediated juxtaposition of material elements, insofar as it was something
unobtainable through strictly discursive means” (Wolin 213).
Benjamin felt an affinity with the surrealists because “these visionaries and
augurs” also sought to overcome the contradictions and dualities that characterized the
philosophical tradition they had inherited in favor of liberated wandering through the
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passages of thought (“Surrealism” 210). Benjamin and the surrealists shared the view
that objects had something to say to them. Benjamin observes that through the course of
the romance described in Nadja, Breton is “closer to the things that Nadja is close to than
to her” (“Surrealism” 210). He says that Breton “was the first to perceive the
revolutionary energies that appear in the „outmoded‟—in the first iron constructions, the
first factory buildings, the earliest photos, objects that have begun to be extinct, grand
pianos, the dresses of five years ago” (210). Breton‟s and Aragon‟s liberated wanderings
through the Paris streets and their detailed accounts of the objects they encountered
mirrored their desire to wander through thought, stepping over the illusory barricades of
new-Kantian and Cartesian categories. Their writing depicts real experience—encounters
with the material world and the ideas it contains.
Surrealist visual artists explored the meanings and significance of these objects in
various ways, and most of these works are directly concerned with the interaction
between the human subject and the objects in its world. Man Ray‟s photographs titled
“Man” and “Woman”, for example, express a symbolic relationship between the human
body and these strange objects (figs. 1.6 and 1.7). The interaction of the human body
with clothing was another important theme for the surrealists, and Man Ray‟s
photographs of women‟s hats explore the sexual coding of the hats, their power to
displace and represent parts of the body. But a peculiar relationship exists between shoes
and feet that surrealist artists use in an interesting way. When Magritte paints a pair of
shoes that don‟t just symbolize feet but that are feet, something interesting is going on,
something different from what was going on with Van Gogh‟s pair of shoes
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Figure 1.6. Man Ray, Woman, 1918. Vera and Arturo Schwartz Collection, Milan; rpt. in Rosalind E.
Krauss, L’amour fou: Photography and Surrealism (New York: Abbeville Press, 1985) 42.
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Figure 1.7. Man Ray, Man, 1918. Musée National d‟Art Moderne, Paris; rpt. in Rosalind E. Krauss,
L’amour fou: Photography and Surrealism (New York: Abbeville Press, 1985) 42.
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What kind of objects are shoes and feet? What might these objects have had to
say to the surrealists who often portrayed them in their art? How should we understand
works of art like Magritte‟s “Le modèle rouge” in terms of surrealist views on the human
body and its relations to objects? These are the questions this project will address.

Purpose and Approach
The purpose of this study is to redeem a set of objects that has been neglected in
the menagerie of surrealist idea-objects and examine it. This study will examine feet and
shoes in surrealist terms, however, to try to understand how they fit into the surrealist
philosophical framework; it will assume a surrealist, and thus a modernist, perspective
and will search for meaning behind these symbols. In his book Postmodernism or the
Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, Frederic Jameson uses images of shoes, the same
painting by Van Gogh of an old pair of boots and Andy Warhol‟s “Diamond Dust
Shoes”, to illustrate the shift from modernism to postmodernism (7). Van Gogh‟s
painting must be understood as a sign that points to something, some meaning,
underneath its outward appearance; Heidegger‟s analysis of the painting, for example, is
the kind of hermeneutical reading that the Van Gogh painting requires. The notion that
the experience of peasant labor can be contained in a painting, as if it were a vessel, is,
according to Jameson, a strictly modernist one. Modern art follows modern theory in
positing depth models, essentially binaries that structure thought. Postmodern theory and
art seek to abandon all depth models of meaning and thought, and Jameson uses the
example of Andy Warhol‟s work, “Diamond Dust Shoes,” as a work of art that rejects
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depth; it is conspicuously flat, a photograph of pairs of shoes stacked on top of one
another, the print coated with glitter (7). Meaning is not contained in these shoes; only
the interplay of signs on their surface is important.
This project runs the risk of being accused of indulging in a depth-based study of
surrealism by focusing on thematic content. I am interrogating feet and shoes to find out
what they mean, and this goes against the grain of many contemporary, postmodern
analyses of surrealist art. Rosalind Krauss‟ treatment of surrealist art, for example, is
concerned primarily with postmodern ideas of meaning as spacing and substitution as
they are played out in surrealist art; in other words, she is interested in the ways signs
function in surrealist art, not what they mean.4 But as the second chapter of this project
will show, the surrealists, Bataille in particular, were interested in objects and signs more
for their power to bring about intellectual change in their audience than to convey some
idea; in other words, they too were more concerned with the function of signs than with
their meaning. In his dictionary for the journal Documents Bataille expressed his aim as
defining not the meaning of words but rather their tasks, and this project will likewise
examine the role that images of feet and shoes played within the system of signs and
ideas that was the underpinning of surrealist visual art.
Furthermore, images of feet and shoes can convey the very ideas about spacing
that Krauss argues are central to surrealist art. The relation between feet and shoes is one
that effectively conveys the ideas of displacement and spacing that Rosalind Krauss
believes are foundational to all surrealist visual art. In looking for a “visual
4

Her essay “Photography in the Service of Surrealism,” published in both L’Amour Fou
and The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths, pursues this analysis
most explicitly.
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homogeneity” in surrealist visual art Krauss finds that there is a “failure of stylistic
concepts derived from the formal, pictorial code…to forge any kind of unity from the
apparent diversity of surrealist production, the failure to arrive, that is, at what Rubin
called an intrinsic definition of surrealism” (Krauss, The Originality of the Avant-Garde
and Other Modernist Myths 101). Her argument is that the photographic rather than the
pictorial code is where to find a set of aesthetic principles governing surrealist visual art.
Surrealist art is essentially photographic because it shares with photography the aim of
creating “an experience of the real itself as sign, the real fractured by spacing” (Krauss,
Originality 109).
Dadaist montages were examples of very evident spacing: they showed very
clearly the spaces or blanks between signs, the white page on which the various images
were glued as a “fluid matrix within which each representation of reality is secured in
isolation” from what it signifies, from its meaning (Krauss, Originality 107). But these
montages rob the photographic image of its most powerful illusion—the sense of
presence. The photographic image gives the impression of simultaneity, of reproducing
on one seamless surface everything that existed in the space on which the lens was
focused in the moment the aperture opened. Spacing destroys this simultaneity because it
shows things as discrete, as separate from one another, or as sequential, one after another.
Surrealist photographers rarely used photomontage, but they introduced spacing into their
images in other ways, and by maintaining the seamless integrity of the print they
achieved the illusion of spacing within presence, sequentiality within simultaneity. They
did this through various methods, for example multiple exposures, as in Bellmer‟s doll
image from 1938 with the silhouette of a shoe superimposed onto it (fig. 1.8). According
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Figure 1.8. Hans Bellmer, La Poupée, 1938; rpt. in Thérèse Lichtenstein, Behind Closed Doors: The Art of
Hans Bellmer (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001) 85.
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to Krauss, surrealist photography is defined by the attmempt to create the impression of a
reality that is spaced, that contains gaps.
The most important strategy for creating spaces in an image, according to Krauss,
is doubling. An image showing duplication “produces the formal rhythm of spacing—the
two-step that banishes the unitary condition of the moment” (Krauss, Originality 109).
These images of doubles open reality up to the possibility of spacing; in other words, they
fracture our sense of concrete reality as a group of discrete objects by suggesting that
even in a moment captured by a camera each object contains within it its own doubles,
subsequent moments of its existence. They don‟t impose an interpretation on reality;
rather, they “are presentations of that very reality as configured, or coded, or written”
(Krauss, Originality 113).
Krauss‟ view is that spacing, or in other words the presentation of the real as a
sign, is also typical of surrealist art in media other than photography. Other surrealist
works of art similarly show reality as itself coded or fractured by superimposing real
objects, as in Breton‟s discussions of found objects that contrive to bring him some
message. A photographic illustration of one such discussion from L’Amour fou where a
small slipper and a large spoon are joined (faisant corps) is one example that is relevant
to this project (fig. 1.9). The odd spacing of these two normally unrelated objects
signified for Breton a mise-en-abyme where together they formed a shoe of which the
slipper was the heel, itself being composed of a spoon and a slipper-heel, and so on to
infinite regress. This vision signified for Breton “his own desire for love” and began his
quest of L’Amour fou (Krauss, Originality 113). Surrealist painting also tends to be
realistic in some aspect: color, texture, carefulness of rendering. A surrealist painting
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Figure 1.9. Man Ray, “De la hauteur d’un petit soulier faisant corps avec elle…,” 1934. Published in
André Breton, L’Amour fou; rpt. in Rosalind E. Krauss, L’amour fou: Photography and Surrealism (New
York: Abbeville Press, 1985).
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reads as real until we notice something odd or horrifying about it, as with Dali‟s Three
Young Surrealist Women holding in their Arms the Skins of an Orchestra (fig. 1.10); or
else a surrealist painting might read as horrifying until we notice something real about it,
as with Dali‟s Beigneuse (fig. 1.11).
The operations of spacing and doubling are employed in various media in
surrealist art, but for Krauss, the photograph is the richest medium for the surrealists to
pursue these issues. Photography is the paradigmatic medium for this kind of spacing,
since it is itself a double of the objects it portrays, or at least it seems to be. The
surrealists exploited photography‟s “special connection to reality” to produce images that
give the impression that the spacings and doublings they have inscribed in the images
exist in reality and were simply passively captured in film. “In this way the photographic
medium is exploited to produce a paradox: the paradox of reality constituted as sign”
(Krauss, Originality 112). Surrealist photography is meant to appear “straight”, a passive
record of reality, when in fact it “is contrived to the highest degree…Contrivance, we
could say, is what ensures that a photograph will seem surrealist” (Krauss, L’Amour Fou
91).
Krauss‟ argument is that this spacing, this inscription of gaps onto the real, is the
principle that unites all surrealist art, photographs and sculptures and paintings alike. But
the surrealists did not just represent reality as if it were coded or full of signs; they
perceived reality as full of significance, and their visual art was structured to give its
viewers this same glimpse of a world structured by surrealist thought. Aragon, for
example, believed that in the reality of the streets of Paris through which he wanders “a
mythology ravels and unravels” and he revels in “this sense of the marvelous suffusing
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Figure 1.10. Salvador Dalì, Three Young Surrealist Women holding in their Arms the Skins of an
Orchestra, 1936. The Salvador Dalì Museum, St. Petersburg, Florida; rpt. in Dalì. Mass Culture, Fèlix
Fanés, curator (Fundacion “la Caixa”, 2004) 85.

40

Figure 1.11. Salvador Dalì, La Beigneuse, 1928; rpt. in Kenneth Wach, Salvador Dalí: Masterpieces From
the Collection of the Salvador Dalí Museum (New York: Harry Abrams, 1996).
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everyday existence” (Aragon 10). Surrealist images are links in a chain of signification
that begins with a reality that it sees as containing ideas within its objects. Breton
referred to this view of reality as representation as either the Marvelous or Convulsive
Beauty.
This is why certain objects or body parts became so prominent in surrealist art;
things like eyes and hats had something to say to surrealists, they figured in surrealist
ideas, and so they reappear throughout the visual art of the movement. The eye in
particular was a body part/object that fascinated the surrealists. Bataille wrote
extensively about the eye and its susceptibility to displacement onto other parts of the
body, in other words its signifying power. His writings are full of references to eyes,
including his novel L’Histoire de l’oeil and several essays including “The Pineal Eye”
and “The Solar Anus” and one titled simply “Eye”, he employs the image or concept of
the eye to illustrate the same notion of signification or representation that Krauss
described as foundational to surrealism. Eyes multiply and are displaced in his writings
to show spacing in the same way body parts multiply in Hans Bellmer‟s doll photographs
(see fig. 1.8). Bataille imagines the jesuve, an eye that opens on the top of the head and
reconfigures the normally horizontal axis of visual perception to become vertical
(Bataille, “The Jesuve” 73-8, “The Pineal Eye” 79-90). This eye stares at the sun, its
spherical analogue, and the two become interchangeable signs for one another. But the
sun is not only the god of light but also of death and decay, of fire and decomposition.
The sun is also a solar anus, it is the identity of the fire-god Prometheus and of the eagle
that forever consumes his liver, the elevated god of the visible and the knowable and the
destructive force that demands sacrificial mutilation, and so the eye is displaced yet
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again, this time by the anus (“Sacrificial Mutilation” 70). The eye is interchangeable
with the mouth, the anus, the sun, the head and other objects and body parts in Bataille‟s
writings; he is evoking in writing the same notion of displacement and representation that
Krauss says is the special trait of surrealist visual art.
But feet are also doubles: they come in pairs and they divide themselves into
equal sets of even tinier doubles, toes. They are further doubled and displaced by the
addition of shoes, objects that indicate the feet they cover by doubling them in both form
and function, essentially replacing them. Bataille‟s frenzy of substitution and
representation was very carefully arrayed around very specific parts of the body because
they were the locations of philosophical ideas that were important to him and to the
surrealist project in general. The eye was an important symbol to him of the assumptions
and associations linked to this part of the body; by playing with that symbol, substituting
it for other body parts, creating jarring juxtapositions, Bataille was trying to uncover
these unconscious but deeply rooted values. He wanted to expose the dualities that
underlie our thought and prompt us to think of the world in terms of good and evil,
elevated and base, high and low; he believed that by exposing to us the structure of our
thought by challenging that structure, making it topsy-turvy, he could dismantle the
structure itself. This aim is reminiscent of Breton‟s goal in writing Nadja, which was to
inspire other young men to set out in the streets to wander freely.
Feet and shoes also play a role in this upending of duality, although a neglected
one. They imply duality in ways that other favorite symbols of the Surrealists (hands, the
eye) do not. Yes, the eye does carry with itself the presumption of a world of objects
outside itself that it can see and thereby capture and possess; but the foot carries its shoes
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with it wherever it goes, and it can be separated from them in a way that exposes the
nature of the relationship. We cannot examine sight abstracted from what it sees, but we
can easily observe a naked foot or an empty shoe. The tensions and anxiety that are the
hallmarks of modernism are fundamental to this lowly appendage, the contradictions and
complications of urban life inherent and evident in it. Whereas the eye needs to be
recovered from the lofty position it inherited from Enlightenment thought, to be
problematized in order for us to appreciate its ambiguity, the foot is already base and
problematic. It wears its shame gleefully, comically, on its sleeve. It is a ridiculous body
part; not central and scary like the eye, or touching and personal like the hand, or noble
and hard like the head, or shocking and vital like the genitalia.
Why not discuss feet and shoes in the same terms as the eye? They are just as
suggestive of doubling and displacement—after all, they come in twos, and their job is to
displace the body. They are furthermore linked to shoes in a way that is also suggestive
of doubling and signification. They also carry a sexual connotation if not as provocative
as that of the eye then certainly more commonplace. But most importantly, they occupy
the pole opposite Bataille‟s pineal eye, and thus carry significance for his project of
destroying Cartesian ideals by rotating the axis of the human body. A thematic analysis
of so-called straight photographs, such as Boiffard‟s toes, is useful since there is little in
the photographs that is contrived besides the choice and isolation of a particular body part
(fig. 1.12). This particular body part must be significant, and the purpose of this project
is to uncover its significance. I want to bring feet out of the shadows.
Bataille is the only theorist of the surrealist movement who wrote explicitly about
feet and shoes, so whatever scholarship exists on the role of feet and shoes in surrealism

44

Figure 1.12. Jacques-André Boiffard, Untitled, 1929, Musée National d‟Art Moderne, Paris; rpt. in
Rosalind E. Krauss, L’amour fou: Photography and Surrealism (New York: Abbeville Press, 1985) 52.
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refers to his writings. He was interested in the ways the human body can contain and
influence thought, and his essay “The Big Toe” describes how the vertical orientation of
the body is profoundly linked to ideas about morality. The head is the highest point of
the body, and its reaching for the exalted sky leads us to associate it with privileged ideas
of rationality, morality, light, and goodness. These are all, of course, reifications, ideals
we invent to help us order the world. Humans have a tendency to ignore or hide from the
opposite reifications: desire, sin, darkness, and evil, because “there is a bias in favor of
that which elevates itself” even though “within the body blood flows in equal quantities
from high to low and from low to high” (Bataille, “The Big Toe” 20). The foot, for
example, is the body part that is located at the opposite pole of the body‟s axis, and so it
occupies the ignored region of all that is dark and base. By bringing it out of the shadows
into the light of analysis Bataille discovers that “the big toe is the most human part of the
body”; it distinguishes the human body from the simian body because it is not opposable
like an ape‟s big toe (Bataille, “The Big Toe” 20). It enables humans to be upright, and
this vertical orientation is the basis for the “bias in favor of that which elevates itself”
(Bataille, “The Big Toe” 20). Humans have a “secret horror” of the foot that leads them
to “conceal its length and form as much as possible,” but this is the result of a failure to
recognize the foot‟s significance—without the foot, the human life that is “erroneously
seen as an elevation” would not be possible (Bataille, “The Big Toe” 20-1). Bataille‟s
purpose in discussing this most simple and base of body parts is to disturb the habitual
patterns of thought that privilege elevation over baseness.
Denis Hollier discusses “The Big Toe” in Against Architecture, an analysis of
Bataille‟s thought that emphasizes its spatial and structural aspects. In a section titled
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Slaughter he discusses the context of Bataille‟s articles about individual body parts,
including “Mouth,” “Eye,” and “Big Toe” as entries in the Documents dictionary
published in September 1929 (Hollier, Architecture 77). Bataille took “a „structural‟
problematic connected to an organic reading of the human body insofar as it poses
problems that are peculiar to it” in these essays about body parts, and the result was a
kind of “lexicographical organ removal” (77). A dictionary is already the kind of text
that sections off the field of reference; it divides signs from one another, it mutilates
language, and “Bataille makes use of the form itself for „anatomical‟ ends,” turning it into
a tool of dissection of the body even as the dictionary is a tool of dissection of language.
The articles carve the body part they refer to out of the body, disconnecting it
from its “organic supports” and “turning it into the locus of a semantic concentration
through which the part takes on the values that are tied to the whole” (Hollier,
Architecture 78). Bataille‟s aim in his dictionary was to carve words out in a similar
way, to dissect the body of language. But he felt that “a dictionary would start from the
moment in which it no longer provides the meaning of words but their job” (qtd. In
Hollier, Architecture 30). His analyses of the various parts of the body were intended to
identify the job of each of them, not the physiological job, however, but their job within
the architecture of the body and thus within “modern pictorial space” (Hollier,
Architecture 79). The architecture of the body and its representation in art were
symptoms of the system of values and ideals that Bataille wanted to overcome, and so
ultimately the “job” of each body part was its role in this value system. But since Bataille
wants to dismantle this system, the “job” of each body part within the system is also the
key to its “job” in unraveling the system by achieving the informe. The big toe article,
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however, was not published in the dictionary along with the others, and Hollier‟s
treatment of this lowly part of the body is similarly scanty; he reiterates Bataille‟s idea of
the foot as the origin and shame of the human body and its connection with the reversal
of values and then proceeds to a lengthy discussion of the eye (77). The mouth and the
eye receive much greater attention from Hollier, and indeed from Bataille. It seems more
could be said about the foot‟s job in surrealist visual art.
Rosalind Krauss and Michael Sheringham also discuss Bataille‟s ideas about feet,
but their analyses are more about the function of the photographic medium within the
surrealist movement than the toe or foot itself. Sheringham discusses „Le gros orteil‟ but
only as an illustration of his interpretation of “the treatment of photography and the
poetics of the photographic document” (95). He is interested in Boiffard‟s photographic
illustrations of Bataille‟s essay because they “combine the irrefutable reality of the
document with a hallucinatory presence that opens the real to the play of fantasy”
(Sheringham 96). These images have “the double power of a document and a fantasy:
[they are] at once a „vision du réel‟ and a „vision de rêve‟” (99). Boiffard‟s photographs
serve a performative function: by distorting the human figure the image causes us to “call
into question our definition of the human”; but the image is also a photograph, and is thus
a document, an “incontrovertible [record] of the reality of what was before the lens” (99).
What is interesting for Sheringham about Bataille‟s essay is how it becomes
illustrated, documented, by Boiffard‟s photographs (such as fig. 1.12) and the surrealistic
payoff of the photographic medium. These images of and ideas about feet and toes serve
Sheringham‟s larger aim of tracing the origin of the philosophy of everyday life pursued
by de Certeau and others back to the surrealists and their own fascination with everyday
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objects, a fascination Bataille and Breton shared. Sheringham‟s analysis, however, is not
of the objects that are documented in the images or the essay, feet themselves, but rather
the way the images themselves function.
Rosalind Krauss also discusses Bataille‟s essay and Boiffard‟s illustrations of it
within the context of a theory of the function of photography in the surrealist movement.
Her analysis is similar to Sheringham‟s in its emphasis on the idea of doubling, although
for Krauss this doubling, or spacing, that is inherent to photography is “the indicator that
the wild sounds of babbling have been rendered deliberate, intentional, and that what they
intend is meaning. Doubling is in this sense the „signifier of signification‟” (Krauss,
L’Amour fou 31). Because as a medium photography has duplication built into it,
because it is endowed with a “very special connection to reality,” the surrealists used it as
a tool to examine the nature of signification (Krauss, L’Amour 31). Krauss also focuses
on the importance for surrealism of photography as a medium. She argues that
surrealism is, essentially, a photographic movement because both the movement and the
medium are concerned, at their heart, with signification as a pure concept (Krauss,
L’Amour 31).
Krauss reads surrealist photographic images as explorations of this very idea of
signification; Sheringham, with Didi-Hausman, sees surrealist photography as a
performative medium. My approach to Boiffard‟s images and Bataille‟s essay will be to
focus not on the photographic medium and its aptness for the surrealist project, but rather
to concentrate on the objects being represented in these works—feet and shoes—and to
talk about how these objects themselves could be meaningful in the context of surrealism.
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Hollier discusses a statement about shoes made by Bataille in an article in
Documents called “L‟esprit moderne et le jeu des transpositions” (Hollier 13). Bataille
wrote “I challenge any art lover to love a canvas as much as a fetishist loves a shoe” (qtd.
in Hollier, “The Use-Value of the Impossible” 13). Hollier‟s article, “The Use-Value of
the Impossible,” discusses the implications of this statement within the context of
disagreement amongst contributors to Documents about the meaning of the term usevalue. Hollier explains that Bataille‟s view of use-value was connected to his ideas about
sacrifice and expenditure.
For Hollier, Bataille‟s choice of the shoe as the object possessing use-value serves
to underline the diverging views of the term—the ethnographers in Bataille‟s circle used
it to refer to something like usefulness; Bataille, along with Leiris, saw use-value as
similar to Benjamin‟s idea of aura (Hollier, “Use-Value” 13). An object with use-value
does not, for Bataille, have exchange-value, because it is unique; it cannot be exchanged
because only it will do. This is the kind of love the fetishist feels for the shoe, and
Bataille‟s choice of object here is important. The shoe fetishist chooses an object that has
a very clear use and then ignores that use. He uses the shoe in a way that was
unintended, and this is the idea of expenditure; the shoe is only valuable to the fetishist
when it is used up.
Hollier talks about Heidegger‟s analysis of Van Gogh‟s painting of shoes, but he
says that Bataille‟s Van Gogh is not Heidegger‟s Van Gogh:
Not the Van Gogh of shoes without a subject, of the shoes unbound by
painting, but that of another unbinding, the sacrificial catachresis which
seized his body proper, the detaching of the ear which belongs to the body.
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An ear which might belong to someone who spits it out over the market,
crying: this is my body, inexchangeable. An ear diverted from the
exchange market. (13-14)
Bataille‟s Van Gogh doesn‟t belong to art history but to “the bloody myth of our
existence as humans,” according to Hollier, and his homey painting of a pair of shoes has
little to do with Van Gogh‟s sacrifice (Hollier, “Use-Value” 14). But Hollier‟s discussion
of shoes is brief, serving to illustrate the central purpose in the article, which is to discuss
the concept of use-value; a more focused conversation with shoes as objects within
Bataille‟s surrealist theory reveals a closer link between shoes and Van Gogh‟s unbinding
of his ear than we might suspect.
What I propose in my project is a more surgical look at the same themes Krauss is
interested in—doubling, signification, representation—as well as the ideas of Bataille,
discussed very thoroughly by Hollier, Sheringham, and Krauss, as they relate to a very
specific set of symbols that appear across media and in the work of various artists who
were part of the surrealist movement. Feet and shoes are such rich objects, full of secrets
and connections to everyday life and central to the wandering that marked surrealist
literature. Again, as Hollier explains, Bataille‟s dictionary for Documents, of which the
essay on the big toe was meant to be a part, was intended to elucidate not the meaning of
a word but rather its job (Hollier, Architecture 30). The purpose of this project is to
interrogate feet and shoes, just as Aragon says the wise man interrogates the objects that
occupy his world, in order to understand their job within the surrealist project. It is a
furthering of Bataille‟s entry on the big toe for his dictionary, an analysis that attempts to
sever feet and shoes from the rest of the body, to dissect them, to examine them and their
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peculiar characteristics, in order to discover their job within the system of meanings of
the surrealist movement. These sphinxes might have some answers.

Chapter 2
The Surreal Foot

Discussions of feet in surrealist art and literature tend to focus on their sexual and
Freudian significance, but this chapter will talk about the foot in terms that are more
aligned with the intellectual aims of the surrealist movement. This discussion will be
more closely aligned with the thought of Bataille and his surrealism than with Breton and
his canonical surrealism, because Bataille is more explicitly attentive to the body and its
signifying power than Breton. The reality of the surrealist movement, so to speak, was
that its visual art was heavily focused on the human figure, and so Bataille‟s explicit
theoretical treatment of the body is vital to a reading of a particular part of the body.
Furthermore, Bataille‟s thought was structured in its analysis of the structure it critiqued,
namely Cartesian duality and its corollary Western morality, and in its development of
techniques for eliminating it. Bataille in his turn felt Breton participated in Western
morality and its dualities by privileging all that was light, brilliant, and elevated and
ignoring all that was dark and vulgar. Bataille‟s own prescription for overcoming
traditional categories of thought was to drag everything base out of the shadows into the
light of day.

Overcoming Contradiction
Everything tends to make us believe that there exists a certain point of the mind at which life and
death, the real and the imagined, past and future, the communicable and the incommunicable,
high and low, cease to be perceived as contradictions. One would search in vain for any
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motivation behind surrealist activity other than this point… André Breton, Second Surrealist
Manifesto

In his second Surrealist manifesto André Breton identifies the fundamental
motivation of Surrealism as the overcoming of binaries (245). When he urges his readers
to follow him and “hit the road” in Les pas perdus, he is asking them to leave behind a
very specific system of thought that he believed was stifling intellectual and social
discourse. In his book Against Architecture Denis Hollier describes the system of
thought that both Breton and Bataille were trying to overcome as a building, an erection,
that sets humans at its head (Hollier 86). This structure is science, the Enlightenment
notion of knowledge, based on classification and categorization, and mankind is both its
ultimate subject and its ultimate object. Hollier describes how Linnaeus set forth the first
scientific classification system of natural organisms in his Systema naturae in 1735, and
in it he arranged living beings into categories of order, genus, species, etc. At the top of
his classification is man—“nature‟s system begins with him, he is no. 1, heading it all”—
because he alone among creatures can produce knowledge. The specific difference of
man, the characteristic that separates him from all other animals, Linnaeus identifies as
the “Know thyself”, a distinction that in the French editions of Systema is formulated as
homo sapiens, the special name for humans that eventually caught on (Hollier,
Architecture 86).
As Hollier explains, this system of classification with man at its head had the
interesting effect of introducing humans into the object of science, the field of knowable
things, as the subject of science, the knower of all knowable things. “Man, therefore, is
indeed the being that produces itself with science”; but the surrealists, Bataille especially,
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found that the vision of humanity produced by science was a sham (Hollier, Architecture
86). Categories of classification, Linnaeus‟ for example, were nothing more than ideals
to the surrealists, human inventions that we assume are real. Among these reified ideals
was reason, the supreme virtue that supposedly enables man to perceive categories and
places him at the head of all creatures; for the surrealists, reason was a prison that
prevents us from experiencing the world. In Paysan de Paris Aragon describes the
difficulty of “tearing himself away from…the mental habit” of subjecting any thought he
might have “to an abstract examination. This spirit of analysis, this spirit and this need,
have been transmitted to me” by “innumerable tortuous processes” that he can only undo
with great effort (Aragon 9). He asks: “can the knowledge deriving from reason even
begin to compare with knowledge perceptible by sense?” (Aragon 9). The resounding
answer heard on the lips of all surrealists, of course, was no.
What the surrealists found most troubling about this system of ideals was that it
had become the basis for a system of values and morals that further separate us from the
world of facts (Bataille “The „Old Mole‟ and the Prefix Sur in the Words Surhomme
[Superman] and Surrealist” 33).1 Georges Bataille believed that this system of values
was especially pernicious because it was arrayed in terms of dualities or contradictions,
placing value on one member of the contradiction and ignoring the other. As Hollier
explains, “Science, having glazed the world over with the idea, eliminates any difference
that is not logical, or reduces it to a specific difference” (Hollier, Architecture 87). In

1

In this essay Bataille is actually attacking the mainstream surrealists, led by Breton, for
themselves creating ideals in their attempt to escape the ideals of bourgeois prisons, but
the language of values, ideals, and the world of facts would have been shared by Breton
and his followers, since it came directly from Marx. Bataille cites The Revolution First
and Always.
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other words, science or reason must categorize every object, and what it cannot
categorize because it is other or is only, as Aragon says, “perceptible by sense,” it
relegates to a lower category and ignores as unknowable. The system of values that
emerges goes from top to bottom: whatever is higher is more human, more rational, more
abstract—in short, elevated; whatever is lower is more animal, more irrational, more
vulgar—in short, base.
For Bataille, the directional aspect of this system carries over to (or perhaps
emerges from) the vertical orientation of our bodies, and our system of values extends to
our own organs. The head is valued because it is high; the foot is disgraceful because it
is low. But Bataille believed that to overcome these bourgeois values it was not
sufficient to try to “forge at once values situated ABOVE all those values, bourgeois or
otherwise, conditioned by the order of real things”; a truly subversive approach must rely
“on presently lower forms whose interplay will in the end destroy bourgeois prisons”
(Bataille, “The „Old Mole‟” 33). The purpose of this chapter is to show how surrealist
portrayals of the foot directly enact Bataille‟s approach to subverting the bourgeois
system of values.
This reading of surrealist art will ignore for the most part Freudian interpretations
of images of feet that identify them as primarily phallic symbols. Breton is credited with
introducing Freud to France, and his version of surrealism is heavily in Freud‟s debt. Hal
Foster, whose book Prosthetic Gods examines modernist responses to the intrusion of
technology onto the body, seems to read surrealist visual art principally as fetishistic;
indeed, he believes “the dominant model of the surrealist photograph is the fetish” (Foster
236). There may be some truth to this, and Krauss agrees that the essence of photography
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as a doubling medium links it to fetishes, since the fetish is a double created in response
to castration anxiety (Krauss, The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist
Myths 113). Certainly feet can be fetishes, and many surrealist images of them have clear
phallic characteristics, for example André Kertesz‟ Distortion (fig. 2.1). This image of
what appears to be a severed leg with feet at both of its ends formally resembles a
castrated phallus, and the two feet are an added element of doubling.
But this kind of reading ignores the philosophical motivations that made the
surrealists want to provoke anxiety in their audience in the first place by “relying on
presently lower forms” like severed body parts (Bataille, “The „Old Mole‟” 33). The
surrealists had in mind very clear philosophical and political aims for their art, and it
would be a mistake to view surrealist art primarily as a field for exploring Freudian ideas
or as a manifestation of an artist‟s neuroses. The surrealists were above all interested in
intellectual freedom from categories, in the value of coincidence, dreams, wandering.
The visual art they produced was, to some extent, aimed at furthering this aim of
intellectual freedom. Certainly, many surrealist images can be seen as fetishes, phallic
symbols, depictions of castration anxiety; but these same images can also be seen as
attempts to dislodge categories of thought and liberate the mind from the bonds of reason.
Works of art that feature feet and shoes within the surrealist oeuvre tend to call up
contradictions or binaries in a particularly striking way. Shoes and feet imply binaries
along two important planes: first, to place a foot in the center of an art work instead of a
face is to call into question the relation of the foot to other body parts, its almost
invariable subjugation in categories like elevated/base; second, the nature of the relation
between a shoe and a foot is powerfully suggestive of other relations, for example

57

Figure 2.1. André Kertesz, Distortion, 1933; rpt. in Rosalind E. Krauss, The Originality of the AvantGarde and Other Modernist Myths (Cambridge: MIT, 1985) 103.
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between subject and object, that would have been concerns for the Surrealists. The foot
becomes the axis point joining these vertical and horizontal binaries. This chapter will
address the way this vertical configuration of the body, and the foot‟s lowly place in it, is
explored in surrealist art.

The Foot as Axis-point
Two early Surrealist paintings of feet set against a seaside background show
explicitly this axial nature of feet. The 1926 painting by Joan Miro, Personnage lançant
une pierre à un oiseau, shows a stylized human figure standing on a beach, apparently
throwing a rock at a stylized bird (fig. 2.2). The human figure is roughly vertical and
consists of one large foot that is planted in the sand, a bulbous body and small circular
head seeming to grow out of it. The painting is bisected by the horizon over the dark sea
and the shoreline forms an even more stark contrast between land and sea. The foot here
is planted at the site of boundaries—between land and sea, earth and sky, bird and man.
Even more striking is the play along the vertical plane of this image: The figure is in a
vertical configuration, but the size of the foot compared to the tiny head suggests play
along this vertical plane.
This image seems to embody the pyramid of values that Bataille is trying to
dismantle even as it calls their hierarchy into question. Just as in Linnaeus‟ classification
of organisms, the human figure is situated at the highest point of the canvas, in the upper
right corner; and its almost perfect circle and glowing lightness against the dark sky
identify it is as an ideal. It rests on a body that is organized on an axis slightly tilted from
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Figure 2.2. Joan Miro, Personnage lançant une Pierre à un oiseau, 1926; rpt. in André Breton, Le
surréalisme et la peinture (Paris: Gallimard, 1965) 124.
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the vertical, suggesting its throwing motion, if abstractly. The bird, its tiny head in the
middle of the canvas, is entirely below the horizon, except for the top of the plumage on
its head. Its body is no more than a line, tilted slightly from the horizontal, its wings
forming a bow from which the arrow of its body will be shot. Although it is unlikely
Miro would have been familiar with Bataille‟s ideas about the axial structure of thought
(the painting dates to 1926, and Bataille began developing those ideas in 1927 in his
essay “The Solar Anus”), the painting seems nevertheless to express Bataille‟s idea of the
verticality inherent in man‟s idea of himself and the horizontality of his idea of animal
nature (Stoekl xi).
Even lower on the canvas, lower even than the bird, is the figure‟s foot. It is
shown in profile so that it is arranged horizontally; it is exactly horizontal in fact, whereas
the bird is tilted slightly, its own head angled higher than its tail. For Bataille, the
horizontal axis is representative of animal life in what Hollier calls “a problematics of
modern pictural space” (Hollier, Architecture 79). Baseness and animal nature
correspond visually to the horizontal arrangement of the animal‟s mouth and anus. The
vertical axis corresponds to the orientation of plant life and of the human body, as both
point upwards, towards the sun. The foot of Miro‟s figure seems to be placed at the
lowest position in the hierarchy of the composition: not only is it literally placed lower on
the canvas, but it is completely flat and horizontal, more animal and base than the bird.
Its form is exaggerated and splayed, breaking apart into five reaching toes, whereas the
body and the head are discrete, clearly outlined against the dark sea and sky. It is also the
only of the three clearly delineated parts of the figure that rests entirely on the sand, no
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part of it emerging from the earth. The head, as Bataille says in his essay “The Big Toe”,
is “raised to the heavens and heavenly things” (Bataille, “The Big Toe” 20).
Another surrealist canvas shows a foot on a beach, and this early painting of
Dali‟s, The Bather, further elucidates the boundaries evoked by feet (fig. 2.3). Dali has
enhanced the central role of the foot by severing it from its body, even dividing it further
until what is left on the beach is a hideous toe. This toe rests on a beach and occupies the
axis-point between the horizontal boundary of bright blue water and brown sand and the
vertical boundary between darker, finer sand on the right half of the beach and lighter,
coarser sand on the left half. This hideous toe, severed but still alive and writhing,
straddles all the quadrants of this grid, inhabiting all categories but not belonging wholly
to any. In both Miro‟s and Dali‟s images the foot stands at the boundary of
human/animal, high/low, self/other.
While both paintings evoke axes and boundaries, Miro‟s preserves the normal
vertical configuration that we are used to seeing in an upright figure. Although the
relative sizes of the body parts emphasize the foot, it remains in an inferior position to the
head. Dali‟s image more radically shifts this configuration by presenting the foot, or at
least a part of it, in the center of the frame. Reclining figures can have sexual or morbid
connotations in part because of this ninety-degree rotation of the vertical axis, as we can
see in this Dali canvas showing another hideous figure on a beach (fig. 2.4).2 In this
chapter I will discuss the ways surrealists employed images of feet as a way to rotate the
vertical axis of the body to
2

It is interesting to note the play between hands and feet in this image. Dali almost never
uses feet to suggest sexuality; hands, however, are powerfully sexually suggestive in his
work. This is somewhat unusual, given the commonplace notion of the foot as a phallic
symbol.
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Figure 2.3. Salvador Dalí, The Bather, 1928; rpt. in Kenneth Wach, Salvador Dalí: Masterpieces From the
Collection of the Salvador Dalí Museum (New York: Harry Abrams, 1996) 26.
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Figure 2.4. Salvador Dali, La beigneuse, 1929; rpt. in Kenneth Wach, Salvador Dalí: Masterpieces From
the Collection of the Salvador Dalí Museum (New York: Harry Abrams, 1996) 27.
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express their embrace of materialism and their disdain for idealism and its binary
categories.

Head/Foot
The surrealists‟ ultimate aim was intellectual freedom from the structures of
idealist thought that imposed categories like high/low, light/dark, good/evil on thought.
One way of representing and perhaps producing this freedom was to inscribe a challenge
to these binaries in the images they produced. Just as ideas could be contained in the
streets, buildings, and flea markets of a city, they could be contained, or projected onto,
the object most readily available for experience—the body. Within the structure of
contradictions that Breton was endeavoring to escape, the vertical configuration of the
body, head/feet, corresponds to other hierarchical binaries so that the head is identified
with all that is light, visible, rational, and good. The foot is lower in space than the head
and so is dark, invisible, stupid, and evil. To isolate the foot in an image is to subvert the
habitual abstraction that places feet either outside the visual field or in a position inferior
to the head.
The renegade surrealist philosopher Georges Bataille believed that one
contradiction encompassed all the idealist morality the surrealists were against, that of
elevated/base. He felt that by flipping this binary, surrealist art could achieve the
dialectical transcendence that Breton insisted was the sole aim of the surrealist project.
Bataille and Breton did not get along; Bataille called himself surrealism‟s “old enemy
from within” and published briefly the journal Documents that was seen as a challenge to
Breton‟s canonical surrealism (Krauss, L’Amour Fou 64). Many excommunicated
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surrealists followed Bataille to Documents when they had fallen out of Breton‟s favor
(among them were Desnos, Leiris, and Boiffard, Krauss, L’Amour Fou 72). For his part,
Breton dismissed Bataille as an obsessive, an “excremental philosopher” (“Second
Manifesto” 624). He charges that despite his embrace of baseness, Bataille still reasons,
and this prevents him from ever truly challenging the status quo (Stoekl xi). Breton was
devoted to dreams and the chance encounter as a way of escaping categorical modes of
thought, and he found Bataille‟s writings too structured. But what the two shared was a
commitment to Marxist dialectic and its power to bring about altered states of
consciousness and, ultimately, revolution—freedom from bourgeois morality and its
reliance on reified binaries. Both were interested in Freud and in the potential of
everyday and found objects as sites of desire and the surreal. They differed mainly in
their respective opinions of the success of the other‟s approach.
Bataille and Breton were both materialists, but Bataille‟s materialism took a
distinct direction; his writings are characterized by a thematic concern with the human
body, its various parts, characteristics, and functions. Hollier says that with his focus on
the human body “Bataille is really intervening against the catachresis requiring that man
only take form with architecture, that the human form as such, the formation of man, be
architecture” (Hollier, Architecture xii). On the contrary, Bataille believed that the
human body expresses man‟s soul in the same way as architecture expresses the soul of a
society (Hollier, Architecture 31). Breton was more concerned with the material world
outside his own body; his novels involve long walks through Paris, love affairs, strange
objects found in flea markets; Bataille‟s fiction is decidedly more erotic and violent, and
his theoretical writings, on subjects like sacrificial mutilation and the role of the eye in
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mythology and in the psyche, almost always take the human body as their subject matter.
By turning his critical eye on the body Bataille was able to achieve a triple dialectic: this
approach subverted moral reification first by simply being a materialist critique, not an a
priori discussion of ideas; second by choosing as its material the object most easily
placed on the inferior side of moral binaries, the body; and finally by identifying moral
principles imposed on the body itself and inverting them. The basis of Bataille‟s
dialectical method was to find every vertical binary and quite literally turn it on its head,
thereby exploding the ultimate moral reification, the binary of elevated/base.
Bataille was influenced by the Nietzschean notion that morality is a construct that
can blind us to the truth of things. “Man,” according to Bataille, “has a light head, in
other words a head raised to the heavens and heavenly things,” but these distinctions,
between raised and lowered, heavenly and hellish, are not real, observable facts of the
world (Bataille, “The Big Toe” 20). Rather these concepts are just that—ideas created by
humans, categories, metaphors we use to lump groups of objects together: “mud and
darkness being the principles of evil as light and celestial space are the principles of
good” (Bataille, “The Big Toe” 20). These principles are what humans, and especially
philosophers, create in order to remain, to qualify as, human. These moral concepts are
organized along a vertical plane, with the upper extremes given the status of ideals and
the lower end banished to shameful disgrace. They give structure to our thought and our
moral system by serving as categories into which we can place objects, including the
various parts of the body. At the higher end of this vertical plane are light, reason,
knowledge, the head and the eye; at the lower end are darkness, instinct, desire, the
viscera and the feet. Whatever is elevated is good and beautiful, worthy of attention and

67
acceptable for consumption; whatever is base is evil and ugly and not worthy of human
thought or notice.
But just because something is not visible, dwelling in darkness, does not mean it
is not there. In his essay “The Language of Flowers” Bataille shows that “vegetal nature”
insists on the harmony of the elevated and the base. The life of a rose, for example, relies
on the existence of both the “rather sordid tuft” of the flower‟s interior as well as its outer
petals; of the tall, clean stem visible above the earth and the system of “roots swarming
under the surface of the soil, nauseating and naked like vermin” (Bataille, “Flowers” 13).
From “the stench of the manure pile—even though it seemed for a moment to have
escaped it in a flight of angelic and lyrical purity—the flower seems to relapse abruptly
into its original squalor” (Bataille, “Flowers” 12). Bataille evokes this most traditional
symbol of ideal beauty to show how reification cuts off much of reality from thought.
Bataille‟s aim is to attack “the substitution of natural forms for the abstractions
currently used by philosophers” (Bataille, “Flowers” 14). What he is specifically railing
against is precisely the reification and fragmentation of experience that the philosopher
Walter Benjamin was opposed to. And the solution he proposes is similar to Benjamin‟s:
specific, objective analysis of things themselves; in a word, materialism. Bataille in
particular is drawn to the parts of things that tend to live in darkness, the parts that
congregate at the base end of the elevated/base plane. Ultimately, analysis of bassesse is
meant to achieve Bataille‟s ultimate goal for surrealism, namely the informe.

The Informe
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In his subversive journal Documents Bataille published installments of a surrealist
dictionary, one whose aim was not to provide the meanings of words but rather to
elucidate their function (Bataille, “Formless” 31). He wrote an entry for the term informe
describing it as a formlessness that eliminates all categories of thought; it was another
way of thinking about Hegelian or Marxist dialectic, one that brought dialectic into the
realm of images. Informe was not given a meaning by Bataille but rather a job: “to undo
formal categories, to deny that each thing has its „proper‟ form, to imagine meaning as
gone shapeless” (Krauss, L’Amour Fou 64). In other words, its job was to overcome
contradictions, not by bridging them, but by eliminating them altogether, liberating
thought from every category. Bassesse was the mechanism by which Bataille proposed
to bring about the informe, and at the same time it characterized his own work: the
mechanism was simply to pay attention to baseness, to turn the usual vertical
configuration of things upside-down, to make visible the ugly and the dark. Krauss calls
this “the mechanics of fall” (Krauss, L’Amour Fou 64). By a simple axial rotation,
arranging the foot and the head at the wrong poles, for example, either visually or
conceptually, Bataille believed he could reveal the ignored material underpinnings of
traditional morality and its reifications—and thereby dispel those failed ideals. This is
the notion of bassesse, the simple mechanism of upending the vertical plane of
contradiction to focus on what normally goes unnoticed—the roots of things.
Bataille also believed this approach to surrealism was more effective, because
more dialectically sound, for the Marxist project of surrealism than Breton‟s. Bassesse
was an answer to Breton‟s method of dialectical reasoning, an alternative way to come to
terms specifically with the opposition of elevated and base. Bataille opposed Breton
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because while they shared a commitment to the Marxist program of bringing about
revolution through subverting bourgeois values, Bataille felt that Breton had not been
able to transcend the binary that most typified bourgeois morality: elevated/base. This
vertical binary encompasses, for Bataille, all moral abstraction and reification, all failure
to see a rose‟s root system or rotting stamen. He believed that the mental state that
Breton sought after, the dreamlike, uncanny merveilleux, was just another form of
elevation.
Bataille accused Breton of having bourgeois values; Breton was an Icarus,
enraptured by all that is elevated and “full of disgust for this too base world that he
believes he scorns—scorns more than anyone has ever scorned it before him” (Bataille,
“The „Old Mole‟ and the Prefix Sur in the Words Surhomme [Superman] and Surrealist”
42). For Breton, “all that does not aim at the annihilation of being in an interior and blind
radiance” is vulgar (Breton, “Second Manifesto” 42) and Bataille sees in this sensitivity
to vulgarity a lingering concern for propriety and in this love for radiance a willful
ignorance of the darkness that underlies it. Bataille believed Breton was blind to “the
shabby, sinister, or inspired events occurring all around him…what constitutes the real
decomposition of an immense world” because of his naïve distaste for the base (Bataille,
“Old Mole” 41).
Breton‟s claim of escaping bourgeois values was unconvincing to Bataille, who
saw in Breton‟s search for “an interior and blind radiance” not a rigorous, Hegelian
empty abstraction, but rather an Icarian flight into “the brilliant immensity of the sky”
(Breton, “Second Manifesto” 42). What Breton was searching for in the marvelous was,
in Bataille‟s view, an escape from contradiction, rather than an elimination of it.
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Breton‟s escape to a luminous dreamscape did not reconcile the contradiction of
elevated/base; instead he underscored it and placed himself on the side of the elevated, a
move that would result in a precipitous drop towards the very ground from which he was
trying to escape.3
For Bataille, morality consists ultimately in a hierarchical ordering of reifications
along a vertical plane with a subsequent masking of the categories and objects that reside
at the lower pole; by looking up toward the sky for a resolution of contradictions, Breton
maintained the moral status quo, according to Bataille. This was the reason Breton‟s
project would ultimately fail to produce revolutionary agitation; his ideas were too
rarified, too out of touch with, in both the moral and the economic senses of the word, the
base. Only by rotating the vertical plane, by turning to bassesse, could the surrealists
hope to shake the masses free from the prejudices of bourgeois morality. Bataille appeals
to Marx‟s discussion in the Communist Manifesto of the revolutionary force that emerges
from the base, from the working class, as an “Old Mole”, a subterranean force that deals
in material facts. This revolution has nothing to do with the bourgeois idealism and
elevation that represent imperialism, Christianity, or revolutionary utopias (Bataille, “Old
Mole” 35). It bubbles up from and keeps its roots in the deepest layers of society. For
Bataille, surrealist art, literature and theory must sink down to the same thorough
baseness to bring about revolutionary aesthetic experiences. In order to complete the
dialectical movement and transcend the elevated/base binary, surrealism must achieve the
informe, the elimination of this most basic of abstractions.

3

In fact it might make good Hegelian sense to think of Bataille himself as this very fall
from the heavens, the moment of dialectical opposition to Breton‟s quest for elevation,
although Bataille would object vehemently.
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Krauss claims that Bataille‟s contribution to surrealist production was to
encourage the creation of images that did not decorate “but rather structure the basic
mechanisms of thought” (Krauss, L’Amour Fou 64). She is referring to the concept of
the informe and its influence on many surrealist artists and thinkers. This influence
emerged in the title of the magazine Minotaure that began publication in 1933, three
years after Bataille‟s own journal, Documents, had folded. This title of this new
publication showed the influence of Bataille‟s ideas about the informe, since the minotaur
was one of its avatars. One way to get man‟s head out of the clouds is to substitute for
that human head, the seat of reason, the head of a dumb bull. The normal polarities of
head/body, human/animal have been swapped in this character, so the animal resides at
the upper pole of the head, the human at the lower pole of the body. This reconfiguration
is meant to awaken us to the very fact of these categories and to suggest their emptiness.
The concept of the minotaur had a job to do—namely, to restructure thought, to eliminate
the artificial categories of thought created by philosophy and morality; in other words, to
achieve the informe.
Another of Bataille‟s favorite personifications of bassesse was Acephalus, a
mythological creature with no head (fig. 2.5). This is another way of playing with the
head/body, human/animal polarities; in this case, instead of inverting one of these
binaries, we simply remove one of the poles—the head. The effect of this is “a rapturous
escape from the self” (Bataille, “The Sacred Conspiracy” 181). This is a being that I
meet beyond myself and “who makes me laugh because he is headless”; this headlessness
is a freedom “from serving as the head of, or the reason for, the universe” (Bataille,
“Conspiracy” 180). The head represents, for Bataille, the delusion that humans are
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Figure 2.5. André Masson, Acéphale; rpt. in Georges Bataille, “The Sacred Conspiracy,” Visions of
Excess: Selected Writings, 1927-1939 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985) 180.
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elevated above all other beings because of their capacity for reason and morality; this
elevation produces the anxiety of solitude and “the thought that it is he or God who keeps
the rest of things from being absurd” (Bataille, “Conspiracy” 180). The head cannot
recognize its affinity with and dependence upon the lower parts of the body because it
must maintain its elevation above them, and this creates anxiety and is delusional. But a
headless being carries none of this terrible responsibility and is, furthermore, impossible
and thus absurd and laughable. Denis Hollier relates this figure of Acephalus to a
carnival spirit that seeks loss incarnate: “Bataille‟s Acephalus does not merely represent a
grotesque celebration of upside downs and bottoms up, but the more abysmal image of a
topless bottom” (Hollier, Architecture xxiii). The point of ritual is not to discover
plenitude through loss, but to experience raw otherness, the otherness constantly present
in oneself: “Bataille‟s carnival…is the moment in which the I lives its loss, lives itself as
loss” (Hollier, Architecture xxiii). The loss of self is the ultimate moment of the informe,
and we see in the figure of Acephalus the mechanism of axial rotation used to achieve it.
But these figures, the minotaur and Acephalus, maintain the vertical orientation of
the body; they focus their debasing energies on the human head. If cutting off the head of
the body releases it from the burden of reason and elevation and other such moral
hierarchies, why not cut off the whole upper part? Why not remove other sources of
moral and intellectual polarities, the digestive and reproductive systems, as well as the
head? Bataille proposes another reconfiguration of the body‟s vertical orientation that is
taken up by many surrealist artists and might rival the minotaur and Acephalus as a
mascot for bassesse: the human foot.
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Headless Foot
Bataille writes about the foot in his essay for Documents “The Big Toe”, part of
the surrealist dictionary that also included the essays “Mouth”, “Eye”, and “Solar Anus”
(Hollier, Architecture 78).4 The essay was accompanied by photographic illustrations by
Jacques-André Boiffard (fig. 2.6). The foot, for Bataille, is a base organ; perhaps the
most base. The foot “is not, however, specifically monstrous: in this it is different from
other parts of the body, the inside of a gaping mouth, for example” (Bataille, “The Big
Toe” 22). It is not as vital and vulnerable as other organs, such as those involved in
digestion or reproduction. But this only means it is even more base than those much
more central parts of the body because it is useless and ridiculous. Not only is the foot
base in its lack of vitality, it also occupies the most obviously physically base position
with regard to the vertical arrangement of the human body. Clearly, it is at the bottom of
the corporeal heap. It is beneath notice.
But although the foot does not have a vital biological function, its symbolic
function within Bataille‟s view of the human body is crucial. The shame of the foot
derives directly from humankind‟s delusions of grandeur, from the kind of reification that
leads him to ignore the parts of experience that are base: “though the most noble of
animals, he nevertheless has corns on his feet; in other words, he has feet, and these feet
independently lead an ignoble life” (Bataille, “The Big Toe” 22). The concept of
nobility, of elevation, is what causes him to privilege the head and ignore the foot. But
like the roots of a flower, the ignoble foot is precisely what makes possible the noble life
4

Hollier explains that since the toe inscribes the specific difference designated by
sapiens, instead of the “Know thyself” proposed by Linneaus, the article “Le Gros orteil”
“could be read as a text that indirectly describes the anatomical conditions of its own
production”; man would not have been sapient had he not first stood up (Against 86).
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Figure 2.6. Jacques-André Boiffard, Untitled, 1929, Collection Lucien Treillard, Paris; rpt. in Rosalind E.
Krauss, L’amour fou: Photography and Surrealism (New York: Abbeville Press, 1985) 72.
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of the rest of the body. The vertical arrangement of the human body, so crucial to man‟s
conception of himself as rational and moral, as different from other animals, has its very
origin at the foot, the point of intersection of the horizontal earth and the vertical body.
The human foot, for Bataille, is the only uniquely human body part, despite its
lowly status. Humans share all other organs with apes and cows—brain, eyes, digestive
and reproductive systems. Only the big toe belongs to the human alone. But it is not only
its form that distinguishes the human foot from the feet of other animals; more important
is the function the human foot serves, which is to hold the human body upright, allowing
it free use of its hands and raising its head to the sky, and to thereby separate it
definitively (in its own view at least) from every other animal, a separation that is central
to the human concept of itself. Bataille compares the human body to a plant or tree in its
vertical arrangement, and it is by this verticality that man differentiates himself from
other animals, moving on the earth “without clinging to branches, having himself become
a tree, in other words raising himself straight up in the air like a tree” (Bataille, “The Big
Toe” 20). But at the base of this vertical stance is the foot, “giving a firm foundation to
the erection of which man is so proud” (Bataille, “The Big Toe” 20).
The foot is thus the foundation for humanness and at the same time its shame,
since in order to provide this foundation it must remain planted in mud. It is the last
contact for humans with our animal origins, but as with any pair of opposites, each
requires the other for its continued existence. Just as a rose depends on its hidden system
of roots, the head can only be elevated because it is held up by feet that are planted in the
ground. Humans would not be human without the opposite category, animal, and the foot
is the axis point of this pair of opposites, an emblem of shame and triumph attached to the
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end of our legs. It continually holds off and jumps off from the earth, and is continually
planted in it. It is the origin of humanness and a constant reminder that it needed an
origin.
Bataille‟s essay on the big toe is an example of bassesse; by turning his critical
eye on the foot, a part of the body doomed to obscurity and ugliness, Bataille reveals the
tension that exists even in this seemingly uncomplicated body part. The head/foot binary
masks the ambiguity of the foot; it is not a locus of a simple pole, but rather an axis point
where the boundary between human and animal is blurred and where their mutual
dependence is obvious. The rage of being at one and the same time elevated and base,
human and animal, is the reality of humanity that is masked by traditional, binary
thinking and that is revealed through bassesse. The human foot is the emblem of this
ambiguity; it sticks in the door of idealism, refusing to let it close.
Images of feet have a similar effect in visual art. The act of placing a foot at the
center of a work of art is a radical reconfiguration of the traditional vertical orientation of
the body; it suggests that the head has not simply been replaced by the head of an animal,
or been removed and disposed of, but has in fact been supplanted, relegated to the nether
regions beneath notice once occupied by the foot. We are used to seeing portraits of
faces, but the sight of a toe, given the same care and detail that the beautiful face of a
woman might be given, is disgusting—and this is precisely Bataille‟s point. This image
of Boiffard‟s, an illustration for Bataille‟s essay on feet, was cropped to give the
impression of a portrait, the nail of the toe a travesty of a human face with all the crisp
detail that would suggest a careful portrait. But somehow the suggestion of any affinity
between the head and the toe is repulsive, or at least comical.
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We are accustomed to seeing a certain kind of mutilation in pictorial space: the
bust or portrait. From the sculpted busts of Roman senators to the Mona Lisa to
Holbein‟s portraits of merchants to Chuck Close‟s self-portraits, the history of Western
art is full of severed heads. We tend to think of this gesture of art as natural, and these
works never appear to us as violent mutilations of the body. We might think of the act of
isolating the face or the head as simply a way of showing the part of the body that is the
most expressive, the center of communicative activities and perception, the part of the
body that reveals a person‟s soul. This view is based precisely on the assumptions and
values that Bataille is fighting against. All art is a kind of mutilation; Krauss explains
that “photographic cropping is always experienced as a rupture in the continuous fabric
of reality” and Hollier says that painting “deforms the body…through a refusal to
reproduce” it (Krauss, Originality 115; Hollier, Architecture 79). But we tend to feel
more comfortable with the kind of pictorial mutilation that isolates faces than with
images of isolated toes, for example, and this is precisely because is because we are in
thrall to bourgeois values that privilege the head and consider it the proper metonymic
figure for the human individual.
For Bataille, art that mutilates the body in other ways can do something more than
a pretty portrait—it can be the same kind of “lexicographical organ removal” that Hollier
says Bataille performed in his dictionary articles on the eye, the mouth, and the big toe.
By dissecting the body, art works such as de Chirico‟s self portrait provoke
“insubordination in the part, which then refuses to respect the hierarchical relations
defining it by its integration into the organic system as a whole” (Against Architecture
78). Dismantling body image should precipitate the dismantling of the viewer‟s value
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system. Dali, who was deeply influenced by Bataille‟s thought, expressed a similar idea
in his essay for Minotaure in 1934 called “Les nouvelles couleurs du sex-appeal
spectral”; he says that woman will become spectral through the disarticulation and
deformation of her anatomy, that the collapsible body is the aspiration of feminine
exhibitionism, which will become furiously analytic, permitting the hanging of each
piece of the body separately, as if on hooks, just as the body of her mate is mounted on
the hooks of the devouring praying mantis (Dalì, in Il y aura une fois, 115). Bellmer‟s
image of a dissected mannequin neatly arranged on the floor (although it looks as if each
piece might be mounted sur griffes as Dali suggested) expresses a similar drive to take
the body apart for inspection (fig. 2.7).
Bataille writes about another butchering of the body in art—the ancient
Australian phenomenon of “hand-templates obtained in caves by applying the hand to the
wall and surrounding it with paint” (Bataille, “Sacrificial Mutilation” 69). He discusses
this phenomenon in the context of a discussion about automutilation, where he explains
that the desire to project “outside the self of a part of oneself” is the desire for
heterogeneity that provokes all sacred ritual and artistic production (Bataille,
“Mutilation” 68). Dali‟s article stresses the sacred aspect of mutilation, relating the
displayed body parts to a religious mantle, and referring to the eating of each separate
body part in language reminiscent of a Christian sacrament. Bataille also sees mutilation
as a sacred act, and he links the production of art with sacrificial mutilation, as in his
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Figure 2.7. Hans Bellmer, Die Puppe (The Doll), 1934, Isidore Ducasse Fine Arts, New York; photograph
by Virginia Liberatore; rpt. in Therese Lichtenstein, Behind Closed Doors: The Art of Hans Bellmer
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001) 28.
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discussion of Van Gogh‟s self mutilation. But the reason it is sacred is that it brings
about the loss of self, which is the same state as the loss of habitual categories that
Bataille thinks art should provoke, the informe.
Hollier says that Bataille‟s texts from the Documents period characterized
“pictorial space with automutilation as the rejection and destruction of the human figure
in practice” (Hollier, Architecture 79). The Australian hand-templates were illustrative
of this view of art as an attack on “the architecture of the human body” because they
often showed that “one or several phalanges are missing” from the hand that was the
template for the trace, and for Bataille these works of art showed the convergence of
ritual and art, both of which are motivated by the desire to lose the self or to spend the
self (Hollier, Architecture 80, Bataille, “Mutilation” 69). To take apart the body in a
work of visual art is to attack the architecture of the body that has become a habit for us;
it is a challenge to the prejudice in favor of either the whole body or at least (or perhaps
even better) just the best part, the head. To furthermore isolate the foot is to rotate the
vertical axis of the body to the most radical degree.
This trick of axial rotation is meant to cause us to question our reaction to the
image. What assumptions allow us to be disgusted by this part of the human body? Why
is an isolated face an acceptable distortion of the body in art, while an isolated toe is not?
This blindness to the foot originates in pervasive moral reifications; the disgust we might
feel when looking at a portrait of a toe is what is required to dislodge our thinking from
the stagnant categories that imprison it. One of Boiffard‟s toe photographs challenges
our bodily prejudices directly by showing a big toe whose isolation and placement make
it look like a facial portrait (fig. 2.8). The toe is relentless, forcing us to admit its formal
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Figure 2.8. Jacques-André Boiffard, Illustration for Georges Bataille, “Le Gros Orteil,” Documents, no. 6,
1929; rpt. in Rosalind E. Krauss, The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985) 100. This image is flipped in order to emphasize its similarity to facial
portraits.
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affinities with a face, suggesting that there is as much humanity in the foot as there is in
the head, taking apart our habitual categories of thought. This is a total inversion of the
head/foot binary, a stunning example of the mechanics of fall. Works of art depicting
feet take as their theme the inherently conflicted nature of humanity, the shame of its
animal origins and its desperation to escape them and anxiety in the success of its escape.
In doing this, they perform the function of bringing about the informe.
On the one hand, works of art that take feet as their central subject make the foot a
figure for the conflicted nature of the human body; the foot becomes a synecdoche for the
body, a stand-in for the material reality of the body that challenges the entire set of moral
prejudices and attitudes that constrict modern thought. In this sense, the foot stands
alone. On the other hand, surrealist art has a tendency to show various body parts in
isolation, not to give them metaphorical power but to evoke the idea of mutilation and
severing of the body. 5

So if we return to Dali‟s Bather (fig. 2.3), we can see a portrayal of just this vision
of humanity that Bataille is proposing: the toe, location of the intersection of the elevated

5

In her article “The Legs of the Countess” Abigail Solomon-Godeau discusses the
obsession with having herself photographed of the Countess de Castiglione, a famous
beauty and Second Empire court celebrity from 1854 to the early 1860s (69). SolomonGodeau explores the implications of the photographic portraits the Countess had made of
herself using framing and cropping techniques similar to those the surrealists used: she
had pictures taken of just her legs, reminiscent of pornographic photographs of the era
that showed slightly more, and in one case took a photograph of her own feet. In one
famous shot, she gazes at the camera, her one eye visible through the oval hole of a
passe-partout frame, deflecting her gaze “outward toward the spectator in a manner that
permits her to be at once subject and object of the gaze” (108). The article focuses on a
period of history outside the scope of this project, but it contains a fine discussion of
some of the sexual and economic implications of feet within the pictorial space of mid19th century Paris.
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and the base, the human and the inhuman, is at once hideous and lovingly rendered as it
sits in its position at the boundary of land and sea. This toe absorbs the repugnance that
arises from the knowledge that we cannot escape the duality of living on a beach, of
being both human and animal, both rational and full of desire. The foot, emblem of
humanity, dwells at the boundary of mud and sky, and this makes it grotesque. This also
makes it human. This tender humanity is an indictment of the fragmentation of modern
life that cuts off this most human of body parts, leaving it on the sand, linked to the rest
of its mutilated members by red traces of sinew or perhaps memory. But it is at the same
time a celebration of all that is base and that has been blocked out and ignored to make
room for the illusion of the elevated. This is perhaps an image of the aftermath of some
orgiastic sacrificial rite in which the toe, for once, not an eye or a finger, has been severed
from the body and flung back to the shore. It is cast down from the height of the body
elevated behind it, already floating away from the sand, away from the earth and out to
sea. This might be the most profound of sacrifices, the sacrifice of an unnoticed body
part that nonetheless is used at every moment. Or perhaps the body is attempting an
escape from its toe, an escape into the top of the canvas, into the brilliant immensity of
the sky from the gritty sand and the ghastly toe, only to find itself unhinged without the
roots of its own elevation, and only to find itself still tied to the toe, if only by a few
bloody threads.
Bataille‟s ideas about the significance of the foot help us read surrealist images of
isolated legs such as Kertesz‟ “Distortion” and Hans Bellmer‟s second series of dolls.
These images play with polarity and axes in a number of ways. The Kertesz piece
reduces the human body to a horizontal limb with feet at both ends, suggesting a radical
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distortion where the axis of the body is rotated to the horizontal position and both poles
are fitted with base feet. Rather than collapsing the high/low polarity of the body, this
image explodes it, spreading it out along the horizontal axis and making its poles
identical to one another so that no matter how far they stretch in either direction, they
arrive at the same place. Instead of reaching for the sky on one end and the mud on the
other, this axis walks in circles. Or perhaps the identical poles negate one another, like a
magnet with two negatively charged poles; the polarity of this distortion is nonexistent—
there is nothing in this figure but unity.
Bellmer‟s images show similar figures, pairs of legs joined at the hip with feet at
either end, and these images present a similar rotation of the body‟s axis, although
Bellmer plays along the horizontal and vertical axes in his series (see, for example, fig.
1.8, p. 35). Some of these dolls are horizontally configured, resembling either mangled
dolls left behind after play or helpless, flailing creatures walking on four legs. The effect
in either case is a dehumanization of the human form. Others of the dolls are vertically
configured, standing against a wall for support, their upper pair of legs awkwardly
splayed in the air. The foot has colonized the body in these images, supplanting the head
as the dominant pole of the body‟s structure, but at the same time taking apart the very
idea of structure, since both halves of that structure are the same.
Magritte‟s “Entr‟acte” shows a similar kind of mutilated human body, although
these creatures are polar, having a foot at one end of their long, snakelike body and a
hand at the other (fig. 2.9). But this is also a challenge to the body‟s structure, because
these arm-legs seem to behave exactly as they would if they were attached to a body with
vital organs, a digestive system, and a head: they clasp one another‟s arms, they recline
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Figure 2.9. René Magritte, Entr’acte, 1934; rpt. in Kenneth Wach, Salvador Dalí: Masterpieces From the
Collection of the Salvador Dalí Museum (New York: Harry Abrams, 1996) 25.
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on the floor, they appear to converse with one another. These axes may display
polarity—one end is a hand, the other a foot—but they are literally folded in on
themselves, precluding the notion of a true axis that extends in a straight line.
These works all present a challenge to our habitual ideas about the orientation of
the human body and about which parts of the body are proper for isolation in art, and thus
they challenge the system of values, the structure of thought that are linked to that
orientation. In various ways these works offer up the foot as a sacrifice, liberating their
viewer from the habits of categorical, idealistic thinking and returning to an examination
of the world of base materials.
One question remains: if the foot is the origin of humanness, if it is both the
emblem of the vertical rise from mud and thus also the one remaining point of contact
with that mud, then what does it mean to cover the foot with a shoe? Bataille claims the
urge to hide the foot comes from the “rage of seeing oneself as a back and forth
movement from refuse to the ideal, and from the ideal to refuse—a rage that is easily
directed against an organ as base as the foot” (21). The shoe serves to conceal the
flatness and baseness of the foot and soothe the rage and anxiety of maintaining rigid
hierarchical binary concepts, what Benjamin believes to be the original sin of humanity.
Is the shoe humankind‟s triumph over the material world? The origin of his
ultimate mastery over even his own origin? If this contact with mud is the basest, most
shameful corner of human bodies, then to overcome it would seem to be the most sublime
achievement. Is the shoe the ur-technology? Or by covering over such a powerful
symbol of the baseness Bataille thinks we should acknowledge, do we fall prey to the
temptation of idealism?
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Or does the shoe perhaps displace onto a product, a commodity, this last point of
contact with baseness? If humans are always trying to distance themselves as much as
possible from mud, and if the foot is the last point of contact, then they invent shoes as a
way of eliminating or at least attenuating, mediating that point of contact. The shoe, in
fact, becomes the point at which man and beast touch, the last tenuous grasp between the
human body and the earth from which it tries to escape. This role has been displaced
from the foot onto the shoe.
More important, do we in fact hide this point of shame by covering it with a shoe,
or do we only emphasize even more our very need for a covering? Do we make the shoe
an emblem of original human shame? These questions lead into the next chapter of this
project, which will address the second plane of the shoe/foot axis, the plane on which the
foot and the shoe interact and tell us something about other binaries that interested the
surrealists.

Chapter 3
The Surreal Shoe

The previous chapter discussed the function of images of feet within the system of
pictorial space Bataille believed was dominant in modern art. Many of these images
challenge traditional notions of the vertical orientation of the body and thus of the system
of values that is tied to that orientation. And since the foot represents the essential
ambiguity of humanity by being the emblem of both its rise towards self-knowledge and
of its need to rise from its base origins, these images are particularly provocative
examples of the informe, or the erasure of dualistic categories. In particular, these images
of bare feet challenge the vertical binary elevated/base that lines up with the vertical
orientation of the head and the feet in the human body, and therefore challenge
specifically ideas about moral and aesthetic values.
This chapter will discuss a different axis of polarity that is challenged in surrealist
art by an object that is closely related to the foot: the shoe. Because it covers the foot, the
shoe raises questions not of the value placed on various body parts, but rather of how the
body perceives and interacts with the world of objects it inhabits. In terms of a
traditional system of binary ideals, shoes raise questions about the modern subject and its
relation to objects. As with the foot, very little has been written about this job for shoes
in surrealist visual art; the purpose of this chapter is to examine the role of shoes in
surrealist art and its implications for the modern notion of subjectivity.
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If we take seriously Bataille’s ideas about feet, then the act of covering them
becomes a displacement of the dual nature of humanity—its pride at having emerged
from mud and its shame at retaining a last connection to mud. Shoes are perhaps a final
attempt to erase or attenuate this connection to base origins by hiding it, substituting for
the shameful foot an inorganic object, a product of human endeavor and ingenuity. But
the shame of the foot is not covered over; it is merely displaced, because the shoe is both
a triumph over the foot and a constant reminder that there is something that needs to be
covered up. In this way the shoe has the same dual nature as the foot, compensating for
some lack and at the same time being a symbol of that lack, only now this ambiguity and
anxiety are projected away from the body, into the object world.
According to Bataille, we cover our feet with shoes in order to hide the rage and
shame they provoke in us as reminders of our failure to leave the mud we sprang from
(“The Big Toe” 23). Does this work? It seems that the ambiguity and horror of the foot
is merely displaced onto the shoe, which becomes a fetish or prosthesis for the foot. Both
prostheses and fetishes are objects that possess a dual nature, like the foot: they protect
the body from trauma (fetish) or extend the body’s powers (prosthesis); but at the same
time they represent the threat they protect from and the lack of physical power that led to
their invention. The ambiguity and anxiety of the human body, its desire to escape the
earth into the sky and its inability to do so, are located in the foot; with the shoe, the foot
has a prosthesis, a primitive kind of technology that maintains this tension by both
protecting the foot and blocking its perception of the ground. In images of shoes, the
question of the human subject is displaced from the foot onto an object of human
production.
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In his book Prosthetic Gods Hal Foster argues that the various factions of the
early 20th century avant-garde movement reacted either with enthusiasm or with anxiety
to the technological prostheses. Foster claims that the surrealists were resistant to
technology and viewed it as an intrusion on the body. I want to dispute that claim in this
chapter by appealing to surrealist images of shoes and showing that in these images we
can see shoes as objects that fall somewhere between the boundary of subject and object,
man and machine. The foot is a perceiving organ, an agent of the subject, but shoes
cover it up and mediate its contact with stimuli, and in this sense shoes are barriers,
intrusions on the body; they are a kind of primitive prosthetic technology.
But what certain works of surrealist art reveal, for instance Magritte’s shoe-feet
(see fig. 1.2) and the doll series by Hans Bellmer, is that shoes are also invested with a
powerful humanness, perhaps by virtue of the closeness of their relation with the body.
Because of their peculiar relation with the body, shoes are a special kind of fetish that can
be an emblem of the destruction of subjectivity that Bataille sought in the informe and
Breton sought in the brilliant immensity of the sky. According to Benjamin, the
“loosening of the self by intoxication is…precisely the fruitful, living experience” the
surrealists pursued for themselves and sought to produce in their readers and viewers, and
shoes can figure this loosening (“Surrealism” 208).

The Foot as Organ of Perception
When surrealist visual artists redeem feet from the shadows, the viewer is meant
to rethink her received notions of the foot’s position with regard to the rest of the body.
Another aspect of the foot that becomes salient in these images of the foot is its nature as
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a perceptive organ. In the body’s hierarchy, the eye holds a privileged position as a
perceptive organ even for Breton, who insists in Le surrealisme et la peinture that vision
is the highest sense (26). Next in line for perceptive ascendancy is the sense of touch,
figured by the hands. But the foot also has a close connection to the world of objects; in
fact, in Bataille’s view, it is our only primal link to the earth that gives birth to us and
allows us to live in the realm of the visible. The foot does not grasp objects or
manipulate them as the hand does, but it lives in close contact with the ground out of
which buildings and flea markets arise, and for Aragon and Breton this contact of the foot
with the street is precisely the openness to sensation and information that a perceptive
organ should possess. Boiffard underscores this overlooked capacity of the foot in his
image of a foot and a hand clasping one another, their fingers and toes intertwined (fig
3.1). This image collapses the polar relation between hand and foot that sees hands as
perceiving organs and feet as ugly objects; the foot substitutes another hand in this
clasping position, and their relation is so close that each member is both touching the
other and being touched by it.
The foot is given (or has restored to it) a perceptive role in this image, and this
calls into question our notion of a unified, perceiving subject. The traditional subject
passively receives through perception, ideally visual perception, information about a
world of objects existing outside it. From these data it can draw conclusions and make
inferences about this outside world; in can come to know it. In this Cartesian view of
subjectivity, vision is the dominant sense because it perceives without the mediation of
touch. It most closely resembles the pure subject itself because it is untainted by
objectivity: its agent, the eye, sees the objective world but is not itself seen by itself; it
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Figure 3.1. Jacques-André Boiffard, Untitled, 1929, Musée National d’Art Moderne, Paris; rpt. in Rosalind
E. Krauss, L’amour fou: Photography and Surrealism. (New York: Abbeville Press, 1985) 76.
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reaches out and grabs visible objects, spanning the physical distance that lies between; it
can encompass objects without being touched by them. Hands are perceptive organs too,
but they muddy the process of data collection by entering into it as both an organ that
touches and a hand that is touched and feels itself being touched. The information
relayed by the hand includes not just data about the object it is touching, but also data
about itself, about what it feels like to be touched. Already this kind of perception shows
the subject to itself as something other than a passive receptacle of data; to restore the
foot to the position of perceiving organ further complicates the Cartesian model.
Boiffard brings foot and hand together in this image, suggesting their similarity in a way
that achieves the informe by collapsing the hand/foot hierarchy.1
These appendages, usually strictly differentiated in visual art as in everyday life,
intertwine so that perceiving subject and perceived object become indistinguishable.
The foot reclaims its role as an agent of perception, although its role is not as pure and
uncomplicated as that of the eye. But this becomes complicated by the fact that feet are
so often shod. What happens to a foot’s perceptive capacity if it is covered by a shoe?
If the sense of touch fails to meet Cartesian requirements of ideal perception because of
its mediated quality, then the fact that feet are blocked from most perception of the
ground degrades their perceptive abilities even further. Shoes mediate and block the
foot’s contact with the world, and in a sense they become the foot’s world, the only kind
1

The Cartesian notion of what Foster calls “the presumed mastery of the subject in sight”
was openly challenged by Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Lacan, but for the surrealists the
ascendancy of sight was still an entrenched assumption they were trying to dislodge.
Their thought and activities were among the first steps down the path taken by these later
thinkers. Martin Jay’s book Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in TwentiethCentury French Thought, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, explores the
rigorous challenge to vision by 20th century philosophers.
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of object it ever touches and is touched by. The foot on its own would be relegated to
ignominy on Cartesian perceptive terms, and covering it with a shoe only buries it deeper
in the world of dumb, nonrational objects.
But of course the surrealist project intends to smash these illusory Cartesian
categories. We have seen that in Bataille’s view the foot represents the very origin of
humanity: it is the ground from which the vertical body springs, desperate to escape the
kind of close relation with the world that is figured by touch and to open up distance
between itself and the world by privileging visual perception; and it is the body’s emblem
of shame in realizing its ultimate failure to retreat from the world. But since Bataille’s
project is to challenge and eliminate all ideals based on binaries, this shame and failure of
the foot is precisely what makes it useful for the surrealist project. In reclaiming the foot
and bringing it to the center of the frame, surrealist images challenge not only the vertical
axis of elevated/base in which the foot is dirty and vulgar; they also challenge the foot’s
place in the horizontal axis of perception, allowing it a place alongside the hand as a
perceptual organ. This becomes complicated by the shoe, which mediates every
interaction of the foot and the world. If the foot is seen as the face of the surrealist
subject, and if this face is so obviously masked, its perception of the world mediated, then
it cannot qualify as a perceiving subject in the traditional sense. One way of approaching
the surrealist foot is as an emblem of human subjectivity as a loss of traditional
subjectivity, an intertwining of perceiving subject and perceived object, between mind
and world, rather than the discrete separation of them that Cartesian idealism requires.

Prosthetic Shoes
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Bataille suggests that the purpose of shoes is to hide the shame of the foot and its
ambiguous implications for human subjectivity (“Big Toe” 20). Seen in this way, the
shoe would be an attempt to overcome this ambiguity, to sever once and for all the
human subject from the world of objects it is so stubbornly linked to; it would be the
ultimate achievement in verticality and elevation. But what actually happens is that the
ambiguous nature of the foot is displaced onto the shoe. Instead of blocking or hiding the
connection of the human body to the ground, the shoe becomes a reminder and an
emblem of that connection, a symbol that the connection was or is there and needed to be
hidden. The issue of subjectivity also is displaced from a member of the human body
onto a product of human labor; the question of how the human body is related to the
world of objects is given a new field with a new kind of object, one that is made by
humans to enhance the body’s function. The question of subjectivity in the modern
world concerns a world of objects, advanced machines and technologies, so closely
related to us that it becomes even less clear who is touching and whom is being touched,
who is seeing and whom is being seen.
We might choose to look at shoes as primitive technologies, very simple
machines that we develop as a protection from harm and as tools to extend the power of
our movements and activities. Shoes are a primitive and originary prosthesis. Freud in
Beyond the Pleasure Principle discusses a process by which an organism “extrudes
structures from its own surface” as a barrier to the “ceaseless impact of external stimuli”
(Foster 144). These carapaces are almost as important in the organism’s functioning as
its perceptive organs. But just as when a hand touches an object the object touches it
back, when the body pushes the prosthesis the prosthesis pushes back. The shoe both
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protects the foot from climate and injury and constricts it, both by pinching and blistering
it and by mediating its perception of the ground. If we choose to see the foot as a sort of
originary technology, surrealist treatments of it in visual art should have something to say
about their attitude towards the proliferation of technology in their world of objects.
When we add shoes to the image of the foot, we break down another illusory
barrier between the traditional subject and the world of objects. The shoe mediates the
foot’s contact with the outside world, just as the sense of touch mediates the subject’s
access to the world more than the sense of sight. First we challenge the subjective order
by giving feet pride of place as emblems of the human body, perceptive organs in their
own right; then we cover up these organs, wrapping them in tough materials that mediate
their contact with the outside world. The foot/shoe pair is essentially a case of isolated
interaction between the human body and an outside object, a laboratory for investigating
the subject/object relationship.

Primal Technologies
In his book Prosthetic Gods, Hal Foster talks about how the concept of the body
changed in the early 20th century and the ways this change affected various theoretical
movements. According to Foster, in the first decades of the 20th century, the human body
and machines were seen as alien to one another, and so their interaction took on a
peculiar, dualistic quality that Foster, borrowing from Marshall McLuhan, calls the
double logic of the prosthesis (109). Machines and technologies are prostheses that are
constructed to compensate for some lack of ability or perhaps to enhance some ability,
and to the extent that they are successful they become agents for the body. But at the
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same time, technological prostheses impose themselves on the body because they can
never be fully part of the body, fully under its control; and furthermore, they are constant
reminders of the lack or need that motivated their construction in the first place and that
persists. Essentially, prostheses for Foster are fetishes for the 20th century; they are
meant to respond to a threat or a lack, but they end up being reminders of that lack and
locations of anxiety.
Prostheses and fetishes share this double logic, and Bataille’s discussion of the
human foot suggests itself here as well. The foot has a double logic in that it makes
possible the vertical orientation that is characteristic of the human body but also dwells in
mud, ensuring that the human body never achieves complete elevation. Feet, prostheses,
and fetishes all dwell at the boundaries of categories, and this is precisely why they are
useful for the surrealists, whose goal was to overcome the binary structure of idealist
thought. These categories are all examples of the ways modernist theorists were
attempting to rethink the relation of the individual subject with the external world.
Freud believed that the machine or prosthesis was either a magnificent extension
of the body or a troubled constriction of it; in these early days of technological
revolution, it became clear that it was both (Foster 109). There is something about
industrial technology that troubled modern consciousness in a way that previous
technologies had not. Enlightenment thought had elevated technology in its preindustrial form to a position rivaling that of religion. Technology in the form of
agriculture, architecture, shipbuilding, medicine and warfare was seen as a new savior
that originated not from some metaphysical realm but in the human mind. But once
technology’s development started accelerating, that view changed. Something about the
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modern machine makes it an even more magnificent extension of the body, and thus also
a more troubling constriction of it.
This anxiety in the face of technology was certainly the result partly of the
rapidity of industrialization; but part of it was also a reaction to the role technology
played in World War I. European consciousness emerged from that war with a grim
realization of the violent potential of technology and with a feeling of physical
vulnerability. The body after World War I was mutilated, fragile, and disposable (Foster
109). The trauma of such a deadly and gruesome war, one that was unprecedented in its
use of technology to kill, led in part to the modernist desire to destroy the old bourgeois
subject. All were haunted by the damaged body of the worker and of the soldier (Foster
114).
But not all artists and intellectuals in Europe reacted to this trauma in the same
way. Foster believes there were complementary reactions to the new intrusion of
technology onto the body, although both kinds of reaction were attempts to rethink
human subjectivity. One set of reactions, those on the left side of political views, held
out a “hope to resist new technologies in the name of some given natural body”; the other
side, which Foster claims was generally aligned with the political right, wanted to
“accelerate [technologies] in the search for some imagined postnatural body” (Foster
109-10). Both were transformations of subjectivity, since both tended to treat the body as
if it were already fragmented, already dead (Foster 121).
On the pro-technology side were, among others, the Italian Futurists, who
attacked subjectivity as interiority and favored a bodily metamorphosis into machine; if
alienation was to occur, the Futurists wanted it to be complete. They believed that man

100
should be alienated even from his own body, and his transformation into a machine
should be encouraged and even expedited. The surrealists, on the left-leaning side of
approaches to the new subjectivity, took the opposite view that technology constricted the
body, according to Foster. They were interested in exposing the right-wing move to join
the body with industrial machines in a harmonious capitalist rationalization “as often
irrational in its effects” (Foster 114). By isolating body parts, or otherwise mutilating,
distorting, or transforming them, surrealist artists were commenting on the state of the
modern body and obliquely expressing nostalgia for the whole, pre-technological body.
In the fragmented bodies of surrealist art we see a parody, almost a caricature of the real
mutilation that modernism and technology inflict on the body, in Foster’s view.
According to Foster’s argument, these various early 20th century artistic and
theoretical movements—Dada, Futurism, Bauhaus, surrealism—each chose one side of
the prosthetic debate; each either celebrated or denigrated technology. He claims that
“this restrictive advocacy of resistance or acceleration was as pronounced in modernist
art as it was in critical theory, and it marks a structural limitation of both formations”
(Foster 110). Yet if we look at surrealist thought as being an attempt first and foremost to
destroy Cartesian subjectivity and epistemology rather than a primarily Freudian
exploration of subjectivity, as Foster does, we get a very different picture of the
surrealist’s attitude towards technology and its relation to the body.
The shoe has a role to play in this: it expresses a more nuanced approach to
subjectivity and the interplay between bodies and objects than Foster argues the
surrealists took. The shoe is a peculiar kind of fetish or prosthesis because it seems not
just to be parasitic on the body or useful to the body, but rather to be part of the body;
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Magritte’s Le modèle rouge suggests this as do the images of Hans Bellmer. The shoe
can be emblematic of the primal unity of the human body and the world of objects,
including man-made objects and especially everyday objects with which we have an
intimate relation. If we think of the shoe as a primitive technology, one that spans the
space between living bodies and the inorganic world, we get a picture of the surrealists as
accepting of technology in principle. This tells against Foster’s view of surrealism as
taking an anti-technology stance of nostalgia for the whole, pre-modern body.

Bellmer
Some of the most shocking surrealist images dealing with issues of the modern
body and its interaction with the objective world, particularly with shoes, are the series of
doll photographs made by Hans Bellmer. He created hideous mannequins, female figures
assembled into grotesque jumbles of excess or mismatched body parts, that were frank
sexual fetishes. The figures are suggestive of Freudian notions of doubling and castration
anxiety and the displacement or transfer of meaning or function of one body part onto
another (fig. 3.2; Lichtenstein 126). His dolls are about doubling and castration anxiety,
but they are also about hysteria, repressed sexual trauma, the fear of growing up,
separation and identification. In Bellmer’s dolls “the body becomes a site of disharmony
and frustration—a prison of tangled, libidinous desire locked into an uncomfortable cycle
of self-reflection and autoeroticism” (Lichtenstein 116).
Much of the writing about these images focuses on their Freudian content, and it
is clear why. Foster, for example, feels the need to reassure his reader that Bellmer’s
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Figure 3.2. Hans Bellmer, La Poupée (The Doll), 1938, Ubu Gallery, New York, and Galerie Berinson,
Berlin; rpt. in Thérèse Lichtenstein, Behind Closed Doors: The Art of Hans Bellmer (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 2001) 106.
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scenes “are representations, not realities” because this is “a fact that some viewers still
tend to overlook” (Foster 232). He urges us to “not be too quick to pathologize Bellmer”
and proceeds to analyze the images using ideas from several of Freud’s essays. The
images’ sexual charge is clearly their principal characteristic for him. Thérèse
Lichtenstein’s book about Bellmer, Behind Closed Doors, discusses his work almost
exclusively in Freudian and sexual contexts. But I want specifically to talk about the
shoes in these images and how they function. Obviously these shoes are fetishes, and
therefore are another layer of fetishizing laid over the fetishized mannequins. But there is
something else going on here too, something to do with the body and its relation to shoes.
Bellmer’s images reveal some peculiar qualities of shoes that are not sexual but rather
contribute to the surrealist project of overcoming Cartesian categories.
Most of the dolls wear shoes, usually the kind of patent leather shoes that are
suggestive of a doll’s or a girl’s shoes, and the juxtaposition of this hint of vulnerability
and humanity against such hideously mangled bodies is jarring (fig. 3.3). But it is the
shoes that do this; there is something human that inheres in them. Without them the
images would not be as powerful as they are. These images say something about the
curious nature of shoes and their relation to the body. Shoes are doubles of feet, just as
Bellmer’s hideous mannequins are doubles of the female body, and are themselves
doubled; but they are something more than doubles. They impart a touching humanness
to Bellmer’s images that suggests they are almost part of the human body. Because of
their unique status as objects that are not part of the body but not entirely separate from it,
shoes achieve the informe by calling into question the notion of a discrete boundary
between the body as a perceiving subject and the world of perceived objects.
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Figure 3.3. Hans Bellmer, La Poupée (The Doll), 1935, Collection of R. Aldoux, Paris, Courtesy of Ubu
Gallery, New York; rpt. in Thérèse Lichtenstein, Behind Closed Doors: The Art of Hans Bellmer
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001) 77.
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Hans Bellmer was an artist living in Berlin during the Nazi party’s rise to power,
and he vehemently opposed their regime. He had worked in advertising until 1933, when
he decided he would no longer produce work that “might even remotely contribute to the
government’s well-being” (Lichtenstein 5). He set out to produce images that would
critique the authoritarian state in which he lived. The images he is best known for, and
for which he earned acceptance into surrealist circles, are his violent and sexually
charged series of photographs of mutilated female mannequins, which he called dolls.
The construction of these dolls was “the remedy, the compensation for a certain
impossibility of living” and if the images he produced were scandalous it was because for
him “the world is a scandal” (Lichtenstein 5-6). They evoked the mannequins in the
windows of fashionable shops, young girls’ play dolls, fetish dolls and sex toys, and the
corpses of mutilated or deformed women. In 1934 his young cousin Ursula was going to
study at the Sorbonne, and he gave her some prints from his first series of dolls to show
Breton in Paris, who immediately published them in the surrealist journal Minotaure (fig.
3.4).
The photographs were a sensation in the surrealist community and they inspired
many other works. Paul Eluard published a story called “Appliquée” in Minotaure in
1935 about a young girl who dreams of an alter ego, her double; this story was inspired
by Bellmer’s dolls and was accompanied by some of Bellmer’s photographs. Eluard later
took Bellmer’s dolls as inspiration for a series of prose poems, writing a poem for each of
14 photographs. But his poems lack the violence and sexual voracity of the images:
“You never hear her talk of her country, of her parents. She is afraid of a negative reply,
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Figure 3.4. Hans Bellmer, “Poupée: Variations sur le montage d’une mineure articulée,” two-page spread,
Minotaure, December 1934; rpt. in Thérèse Lichtenstein, Behind Closed Doors: The Art of Hans Bellmer
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001) 42.
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she fears the kiss of a silent mouth. Agile and liberated, gentle mother-child”
(Lichtenstein 53). His dolls were the inspiration for the famous street of mannequins at
the International Exhibition of Surrealism in Paris in 1938 (see a photograph of Raoul
Ubac’s mannequin fig. 3.5), but again these derivations lacked the power of Bellmer’s
own images (Lichtenstein 6).
Bellmer’s dolls are monstrous amalgamations of female body parts, photographed
in contexts suggestive of domination and vulnerability. There is a deep current of
Freudian theory running through these images that can be traced back to Bellmer’s own
psychological state but also to his source of inspiration. Bellmer had seen the
Offenbach’s opera The Tales of Hoffman, based on stories for children by E.T.A.
Hoffmann, and was enthralled by the story of The Sandman, and especially by the
depiction in it of a life-size doll, Olympia (65). Although he had already been planning
to construct his dolls, this paradigmatic story of the uncanny deeply influenced him.
The story is about a young man, Nathaniel, who is driven by the scopic drive to
look through his telescope into the buildings of the city he lives in. He looks into the
workshop of a toymaker and falls in love with a doll in the shop, Olympia. From this
distance he allows himself to project his own feelings and actions onto the doll,
animating her through fantasy and imagining her to be his soul mate, his female double.
Olympia is dismembered by the dollmaker/father, and Nathaniel eventually commits
suicide. Freud famously used this story to elaborate his idea of the uncanny, a category
of objects or experiences that produce a feeling of unease or horror. The category of the
uncanny is closely related to the surreal: both employ a mechanism of doubling or
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Figure 3.5. Raoul Ubac, Mannequin, 1937, Galérie Adrien Maeght, Paris; rpt. in Rosalind E. Krauss,
L’amour fou: Photography and Surrealism (New York: Abbeville Press, 1985) 56.
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displacement and both are designed to produce an emotional or intellectual state of
confusion, where normal categories are suspended or destroyed.
Freud describes as uncanny, or unheimlich, the strange feeling that is associated
with doubling and the anxiety of castration associated with it. It is often produced by
images of mechanical processes at work “beneath the ordinary appearance of animation”
(Freud, “The Uncanny” 132). The familiar, heimlich, suddenly becomes unfamiliar and
threatening when we perceive the inanimacy that underlies what we perceive to be living
beings but realize are doubles, as with Olympia and other automata. Any time an
inanimate object mimics a living being we feel tricked, unsure of our own perceptions, no
longer at home in the world. Another way of understanding the uncanny is in terms of
concealment and revelation; Freud calls uncanny anything that has been uncovered that
ought to be hidden, as with an automaton whose mechanical workings are meant to be
secret. Freud saw Hoffmann’s tale as a perfect expression of the uncanny.
Nathaniel’s experience of unwittingly falling in love with his own double and
then seeing her dismembered is, for Freud, a prime example of the uncanny. It typifies
the castration anxiety that accompanies the oedipal stage, “when sexual difference and
the symbolic are instated” (Lichtenstein 101). Realizing that his mother lacks a penis, the
little boy creates a double of his own penis out of fear that he could suffer the castration
he thinks his mother has undergone. The double or fetish only serves, however, to
remind him of the threat, and the more fetishes he creates, the more he is reminded of the
threat. Nathaniel watches through his telescope (another phallic symbol or fetish, one
that directly connects the uncanny to the eye and thus to the tale of Oedipus) as
dismembered doll parts move and his own double is taken apart; in other words, he is
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blinded, castrated. He sees that his double was his own invention and could not protect
him from the threat of castration. This uncanny glimpse of the dismembered dolls makes
Nathaniel aware of the fiction he has created, and thus of the threat of castration that
caused him to create it, a threat that remains in place. The blood-chilling notion is that
there may be other automata surrounding him that he takes for living beings. The
realization of the mechanical workings underlying apparently living beings reflects
Oedipus’ realization of his own inability to escape the mechanical forces of his fate that
are beyond his control, the inevitability of sexual difference and patricide.
Bellmer’s dolls employ the idea of the double, the automaton, as the embodiment
of the threat of castration, as a fetish. Already the figure of a mannequin suggests a
double, an imitation of a living body, as does Hoffmann’s Olympia. But Bellmer pushes
this idea of doubling, creating dolls whose own bodies are doubling. His first set of
figures seem to be multiplying parts so rapidly and uncontrollably that they are folding in
on themselves (fig. 3.6). The second set of images, from 1935, are more straightforward
examples of fetishistic doubling—two pairs of legs joined at the waist, clumsy and
helpless (fig. 3.7). These dolls recall Kertesz’ snakelike Distortion (see fig. 2.1) and
Magritte’s Entr’acte (see fig. 2.9); all show isolated legs with feet and/or hands at their
ends and are easily read as phallic symbols. They are all fetishes in the Freudian sense.
Krauss sees Bellmer’s dolls as Medusa’s heads, containing a “multiplication of penis
symbols [that] signifies castration” (Amour 76). They suggest a violent sexuality—the
victimization and mutilation of a helpless and inherently female being—that expresses
Bellmer’s attitudes toward the predations of the Nazi regime, which in some sense was
the ultimate threat of
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Figure 3.6. Hans Bellmer, La Poupée (The Doll), 1935, Ubu Gallery, New York, and Galerie Berinson,
Berlin; rpt. in Thérèse Lichtenstein, Behind Closed Doors: The Art of Hans Bellmer (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 2001) 9.
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Figure 3.7. Hans Bellmer, La Poupée (The Doll), 1935, Collection of R. Aldoux, Paris, Courtesy of Ubu
Gallery, New York; rpt. in Thérèse Lichtenstein, Behind Closed Doors: The Art of Hans Bellmer
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001) 62.
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castration, the ultimate father figure, according to Lichtenstein (Lichtenstein 21). She
also discusses Bellmer’s own psychological state at length, citing the early death of his
tubercular wife, his sexual fascination with his young cousin Ursula, and his strained
relationship with his father (a “conservative, punitive, authoritarian” figure who
disapproved of Bellmer’s cross-dressing) as origins of the sexual content of his images.
Indeed, Lichtenstein’s approach to Bellmer is biographical, and thus almost wholly
psychoanalytic. Like Foster, she approaches Bellmer’s works as primarily Freudian
texts. Even Bellmer’s avowed anti-Nazi motivation in making the dolls is turned into a
displacement of his Oedipal feelings towards his father onto der fuhrer: “a return to the
preoedipal stage [in his work] seems to have functioned as a personal psychic rebellion
against the father and a revolt against the law of the Nazi Fatherland” (Lichtenstein 72).
In the hands of Foster and Lichtenstein, Bellmer’s images come across as dangerous,
pathological, obsessive outbursts of troubled sexuality.
This is no doubt part of what prompted Breton to publish them immediately. But
the images were interesting to the surrealists for other reasons that had to do more with
the intellectual effects the images could produce than the psychological. The surrealists
were not interested in artists’ personal neuroses; they wanted their art to send people out
into the street, wandering freely through ideas without the constraints of Cartesian
categories. Art, for the surrealists, had a job to do. They wanted to escape the strictures
of the tradition of thought they had inherited, specifically its rational categorization of the
world into binaries; Bataille called this “category that would allow all categories to be
unthought” the informe and sought it in everything that is low and base (Krauss, L’Amour
Fou 64). The surrealists were probably more interested in the capacity of Bellmer’s
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images to produce the informe than in their Freudian content; more precisely, it was the
similarity of the category of the uncanny with the informe that constituted the affinity
between Bellmer and the surrealists. The shock of violent sexuality in Bellmer’s images,
which can and often is read in psychoanalytic terms, is a form of bassesse, and this is
probably why they were so enthusiastically accepted for publication in Minotaure, a
journal that was heavily influenced by Bataille and his concept of the informe (Krauss,
L’amour fou, 64).
Both the uncanny and the informe involve realistic representations, doubles, of
everyday objects or figures that are distorted through an action that reveals some aspect
of the object that normally remains hidden, and this has the effect of suspending or
blurring habitual categories like familiar/unfamiliar, animate/inanimate. But the uncanny
and the informe also call into question the habitual category subject/object, because both
categories call into question the subject’s perceptive abilities: Nathaniel’s telescope, his
prosthetic eye, fails to reveal to him Olympia’s true nature; and avatars of the informe,
Acephalus for example, are deprived of their eyes and I am arguing that the foot is
deprived by the shoe of its perceptive abilities. Both the uncanny and the informe also
challenge notions of the boundary between the perceiving subject and the world of
perceived objects and thus the notion of a discrete self, and in both cases this is achieved
by the mechanism of doubling: the double is another case of the uncanny, just as
Nathaniel viewed Olympia as his double, and the production of a double, according to
Freud, is a response to the blurring of the boundaries of individuality and the threat of
castration that arise during the oedipal stage, when a young child is developing an idea of
himself as a subject, separate from his mother; and the informe is the annihilation of the
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self as perceiving, rational mind by the loss of all categories of thought. So we can
substitute the category informe for the uncanny in our reading of Bellmer’s images. In
fact, considering the deep influence of Bataille’s ideas on Minotaure, the journal in which
the images were published, such a reading would more accurately represent the images’
role in the surrealist movement.
These images of doubled legs conform to the image of the informe I suggested in
the previous chapter in their eradication of all the subjective, perceiving organs; like
Acephalus, these dolls have lost their heads—and also their hearts, stomachs, and hands.
Bellmer has inverted the vertical polarity of the body. But he adds a layer of complexity
to these figures, because these are not just bodies; almost without exception they are
wearing shoes. His second series of dolls, made in 1935, show almost no doll faces but a
proliferation of doll shoes. The presence of the shoes seems to heighten the disturbing
quality of the images by contributing to the illusion that the figures are real bodies, not
mannequins. In this way, it seems that shoes enhance the uncanniness of the figures, and
if we think about shoes as a class of objects they seem to fit Freud’s concept of the
uncanny. They are inanimate objects that follow the form of feet so closely that they
seem to mimic feet, to almost become an extension of them. Shoes are doubles of feet;
the stiffness of the material they are usually made from ensures that even when they are
empty they retain the shape of the feet they are meant to cover. Empty shoes have the
eerie quality of an absent body that an empty dress, for example, does not. Furthermore,
shoes are considered necessary for daily function in a way that other clothing is not; we
might wear gloves to chop wood but not to play the piano, but we almost never go
without shoes (gloves were another recurring image in surrealist art, though they didn’t
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receive as much attention as shoes). They stand in for our feet in most situations. An
empty shoe is often an eerie, disturbing sight, perhaps because we are so used to seeing
shoes at the end of people’s legs that we think of them as feet, and seeing them alone is
almost like seeing severed body parts. These automata, like Hoffmann’s Olympia, are
dead objects that mimic life.
Seen in this way, as doubles of feet, the shoes in Bellmer’s images are emblems
of castration anxiety, an additional doubling superimposed onto the doubling of the
mannequin and her mutilated form. The shoes are fitted onto bodies so deformed that
they have no need of the shoes as protection for walking. The shoes are fetishes, attempts
to ward off castration and the threat of violation, but also reminders that the threat exists.
They are also fetishes in the more contemporary, sexual sense, because they are almost
always the patent leather Mary Jane style of shoe that immediately evokes young girls
and, of course, dolls. The shoes’ presence seems to enhance the hideousness of the
images, to intensify their uncanny quality. The shoe mirrors, doubles the concept of the
mannequin as a mockery or a travesty of the human form, because a shoe is a mockery or
a travesty of the human foot.
But if the presence of the shoes in these images underscores their violence, it is
because they seem to be the most recognizably human element of the composition. As a
class of objects, shoes may share some characteristics of uncanny automata, but in these
images it becomes clear that they are something more than just doubles of the feet: they
have an inherently human quality. Bellmer’s dolls are not at all subtle in their mutilation
of the human form: they were carefully constructed to be anatomically correct to a
gruesome degree, but their ball joints are also meant to be evident, as well as the texture
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of their plaster surface. Their configuration is meant to be clearly physically impossible,
and the lighting and high-focus photography expose the seams and materials of these
constructions. In one sense this is consistent with the idea of doubling and with the
fragmentation of the body. But this fragmentation needs an element of the real in it,
otherwise the figures would look ridiculous instead of grotesque. The only
unmanipulated objects, the only real, heimlich objects in the photographs are the shoes.
Because shoes are substitutions for feet rather than just clothing for them, because they
stand in for feet, they add this element of wholeness to the dolls. Without them the
mannequins would lose this link to real bodies that wear shoes and would seem less
vulnerable and poignant. Shoes contribute to the uncanny quality of Bellmer’s doll
images, but only because even in their uncanniness, there is something canny, something
inherently human about shoes. Bellmer’s images uncover this peculiar quality of shoes.
The doll pictured in figure 3.8, for example, is among the most detailed and
graphic of Bellmer’s models. It shows his interest in the use of the ball joint in anatomy.
The limbs are beautifully shaped, the surfaces shaded and almost classically
proportioned, the pose relaxed. This is almost an idealized nude, albeit a slightly strange
one. This image is from Bellmer’s first doll series made in 1934, the series that was first
published in Minotaure. The majority of Bellmer’s doll images after 1934, like the doll
from the series of 1935 in figure 3.9, are wearing shoes, stockings, and no other clothing.
The boots are an unmistakable visual cue of humanness in this image, orienting the legs
towards the wall, identifying them as legs. They provide a context for the figure, a
connection between it and the world that we live in, a world where feet are most often
covered by shoes. In this way the shoes in Bellmer’s images prevent the mannequins
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Figure 3.8. Hans Bellmer, La Poupée (The Doll), 1935, Collection of Claude Berri, Courtesy of Ubu
Gallery, New York; rpt. in Thérèse Lichtenstein, Behind Closed Doors: The Art of Hans Bellmer
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001) 24.
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Figure 3.9. Hans Bellmer, La Poupée (The Doll), 1935, Collection of R. Aldoux, Paris, Courtesy of Ubu
Gallery, New York; rpt. in Thérèse Lichtenstein, Behind Closed Doors: The Art of Hans Bellmer
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001) 100.
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from being too idealized, such grotesque mutilations of the human form that they stray
too far from reality and become cartoonish or worse, for the surrealists, idealized.
But it is significant that Bellmer chose shoes to play this role and not some other
article of clothing. Many of Bellmer’s dolls are nothing more than legs, some joined at
the waist with another pair of legs, some emerging from between a dirty mattress and a
wall, casualties at the end of some violent schoolyard game. In the absence of a face,
shoes seem to do the trick of identifying a figure and arousing our interest and emotional
concern for it. Bellmer’s choice of severed legs as the only body parts for his second
series of dolls is an example of Bataille’s mechanism of bassesse, placing the basest,
most lowly parts of the body at the center of the frame as a way of leveling hierarchies
and eliminating categories. But when Bellmer puts shoes on the ends of these severed
legs, he takes a step outside the body and examines the relationship between these
mutilated subjects and an inanimate object.
Shoes imply feet, formally speaking, in a way that other articles of clothing do not
imply the body parts to which they belong. This is the notion that Dali and Schiaparelli
played with in their collaborative project of a shoe hat (3.10). A shoe has a much more
narrow functional scope than other articles of clothing, and in this way it is similar to the
hat—it is not really possible to put a hat anywhere but on the head, and shoes can really
only be precariously placed on any body part other than the foot, and the effect is comical
(slightly so at least in this snapshot of Dali, taken by his wife; fig. 3.11). A hat only fits a
head; but almost any kind of material, even some other piece of clothing, can be
appropriated and made into a hat (anyone who has seen the film Grey Gardens knows
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Figure 3.10. Salvador Dalì, Page from Sketchbook, c. 1937, Private collection; rpt. in Richard Martin,
Fashion and Surrealism (New York: Rizzoli, 1987) 110.
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Figure 3.11. Gala Dalì, Salvador Dali at Port Lligat, c. 1932; rpt. in Richard Martin, Fashion and
Surrealism (New York: Rizzoli, 1987) 110.
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that it is possible, and is considered chic by many fashion insiders, to transform an old
cardigan into a turban). But a shoe is not so easily repurposed or replaced. It can sit on a
head, but it doesn’t fit there. Dali’s sketches of shoe-hats are bizarre because the idea of
a shoe on one’s head is an example of bassesse, the exchange of the foot and the head,
displaced onto inanimate objects.
But it is also bizarre because shoes are formally so tied to feet; they fit feet. Shoes
are made from tough materials and they conform so closely to the shape of feet because
they serve not just as doubles of feet—they are feet. Or almost. They differ from other
articles of clothing in the responsibility surrendered to them by the body (various articles
and styles of clothing are exchangeable depending on the occasion, but shoes are
constant) and in their fidelity to the body part they are made for (a dress without a body
might serve as a scarf or a rag, a hat may become an improvised fan, but shoes know their
place). Shoes are so closely tied to feet that they are perhaps the most intimate prosthesis
we have; they are almost part of the human body. A shoe without a foot is very
obviously empty.
Shoes are something more than doubles of feet—they are substitutions for feet,
they are, in western society, the foot’s avatars, its agents. They are a part of the body in
the same way a snail’s shell is part of its body, a shield that it creates and throws off from
itself but also carries around in all its perambulations. This peculiar nature of shoes
means that when they appear in surrealist art, they are fetishes, doubles of feet, but also
something more. Their job in the pictorial space of surrealism is to figure the loss of the
self.
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Sacrifice
The sight of an empty, abandoned shoe is an uncanny one; it is almost like seeing
a severed foot, so close is the relation between foot and shoe. Bataille perceived the
relation of the body with inorganic objects as an inevitable consumption that was part of
everyday life. The communion of foot and shoe can even result in a sacred loss of self,
since the shoe is thrown out from the body, a part of it and also separate from it. This
approach to the products and objects used by the body does not indicate the kind of
anxiety that Foster claims the surrealists felt about the encroachment of the world of
objects into the body. Rather, it shows that the surrealists wanted precisely to lose the
self through a sacrifice of a fetish.
In his preface to his Arcades project (called “Paris, Capital of the Nineteenth
Century”), Benjamin talks about the phantasmagoria of the national exhibitions of
industry that were popular diversions in the 19th and early 20th centuries (and that might
be compared to any number of contemporary phenomena, most likely the mall). He calls
them “places of pilgrimage to the commodity fetish” in which the exchange value of the
goods trumps their use value such that these items, beyond the purchasing power of the
working class spectators, become divertissements instead of useful objects (17). These
exhibitions created a universe of specialites, a dream world of objects that are useless
apart from their power to distract and to attract desire. These commodities, some so far
beyond the reach of the common worker, others constantly made new, inspire the
unquenchable longing reserved for deities.
According to Benjamin, clothing played a special role in the commercial
pantheon: “Fashion prescribes the ritual according to which the commodity fetish
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demands to be worshipped” (Benjamin, “Paris” 18). It derives this authority from the
intimacy of the relationship between clothing and the human body; fashion “couples the
living body to the inorganic world” (19). This is an explicitly sexual coupling, for
Benjamin, who describes a tendency to submit to the dictates of fashion as succumbing
“to the sex appeal of the inorganic” (19). He then quotes a passage from Apollinaire that
illustrates an indiscriminate congress of the human body and the world of inorganic
objects: “Any material from nature’s domain can now be introduced into the composition
of women’s clothes. I saw a charming dress made of corks…Steel, wool, sandstone, and
files have suddenly entered the vestmentary arts…They’re doing shoes in Venetian glass
and hats in Baccarat crystal” (19). This perverse union of body and object world is
justified as modern because it is presented as new. Any debasement of a commodity that
arises from assigning it a price, from signifying it, is mitigated by its newness—a quality
of inestimable value.
But this newness is also an illusion, and fashion is a deceitful oracle, because the
coupling of the living body and the inorganic world is the oldest idea in the book.
Bataille wrote extensively about the constant tension in human life between the sacred
and the profane, or the heterogeneous and the homogeneous. Human social activity can
be understood as divided into two realms of experience: everyday life, the homogeneous
or profane realm of civil society and consumption; and ritual, a class of sacred activities
motivated by the heterogeneous drive. Unusual events, such as periods of mourning or
entry into a new phase of life, can motivate a desire to temporarily abandon normal
activities and undo the homogeneity or the wholeness of a society and even of the
physical body. Animal sacrifice and sometimes self-mutilation are examples of “the
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rupture of personal homogeneity and the projection outside the self of a part of oneself,
with their rage and pain” (Bataille, “Sacrificial Mutilation” 68). This kind of ritual
removes from the individual or the society the ideas and objects that it cannot contain,
including the idea of a discrete self.2
The opposite pole contains the everyday, profane activities of social life. These
activities require the absorption of heterogeneous entities into a harmonious whole, and
the means to this is the process of appropriation, whose elementary form is oral
consumption (Bataille, “The Use-Value of D.A.F. de Sade” 95). If sacrifice is a
redemption from homogeneity, an act of removing from the whole some undesirable
member or quality (sin, for example), then eating is a redemption from the division of
heterogeneity, a healing of the torn fabric of community (by eating the symbolic body of
Christ, for example). But “man does not only appropriate his food, but also the different
products of his activity: clothes, furniture, dwellings, and instruments of production”
(Bataille, “de Sade” 95). Bataille is saying that the natural, everyday state of humans is
to be in a homogeneous relation with the everyday objects that surround them, to
consider those objects as being a part of their own bodies. The idea that the living body
could be coupled with the inorganic world is not a new one, although fashion pretends it
is.

The Body
Pretend-on mettre encore la main sur un homme ‘naturel’?
2

Religions, however, should not be thought of as answers for the human need for
heterogeneous projection of self; rather, they are “the totality of prohibitions, obligations,
and partial freedom that socially channel and regularize this projection”; in other words,
they are appropriations of the need for sacred heterogeneity (96).
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Breton, Les Pas perdus 249

But the homogeneity of the human body and its products is not the kind of
dissolution of the subject Bataille is after. He is not like the Futurists, whom Foster
describes in Prosthetic Gods as eager for the complete consumption and consummation
of human body and machine into a postnatural body, the loss of the subject to the
technological world (Foster 110). Nor is Bataille reacting with anxiety to the imposition
of technology on the body as a restriction, as Foster argues was the surrealist stance
(Foster 109). Instead, Bataille explains the interaction of body and world in biological,
digestive terms, insisting on the necessity both of the consumption of objects by the body
and of the excretion of its waste products through acts of sacrifice, mutilation, and art that
permit the temporary dissolution of the subject. Though Foster argues that “this
restrictive advocacy of resistance or acceleration was as pronounced in modernist art as it
was in critical theory, and it marks a structural limitation of both formations,” in fact
Bataille’s views do not advocate either a resistance or an acceleration of human reliance
on technology (Foster 110). And we might choose to see in the case of shoes a special
kind of prosthesis, a primitive technology that is intimately connected with the body and
can thus be a candidate for sacrificial self-mutilation, a sacred emblem of the loss of the
self.
In his essay “The Use-Value of the Impossible” Hollier quotes Bataille from his
essay in the last issue of Documents: “I challenge any art lover to love a canvas as much
as a fetishist loves a shoe” (qtd. In Hollier 13). Bataille is disparaging here the exchangevalue of art as compared with the sacred use-value of the fetish shoe. Hollier discusses
Bataille’s choice of shoes in this challenge and refers to Van Gogh, not to talk about his
painting of shoes but rather to relate Bataille’s reference to fetish shoes with his ideas
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about sacrificial mutilation. The shoe that has been made into a fetish is no longer in use;
its singularity belongs not to its value as equipment, because any shoe might do for
trudging through the fields. For the fetishist, the shoe is valuable in itself, an object of
reverence. Hollier talks about Heidegger’s analysis of Van Gogh’s painting, but he says
that Bataille’s Van Gogh is not Heidegger’s Van Gogh.
Not the Van Gogh of shoes without a subject, of the shoes unbound by
painting, but that of another unbinding, the sacrificial catachresis which
seized his body proper, the detaching of the ear which belongs to the body.
An ear which might belong to someone who spits it out over the market,
crying: this is my body, inexchangeable. An ear diverted from the
exchange market. (13-14)

But perhaps the Van Gogh of shoes without a subject is the same Van Gogh who
detaches his ear; perhaps Van Gogh chose to paint shoes because of their inherently
fetishistic character as doubles of the feet, part of the body but not part of it, conforming
to the foot’s contours and mediating its access to the ground, the location of the human
body’s last contact with its muddy origins or the displacement of that location. If shoes
span the supposed divide between body and world, then an empty pair of shoes is in a
sense like a severed ear; it is already a “rupture of personal homogeneity” because it is a
dead object that nonetheless acts as a member of the body, and when it is empty it is even
more a “projection outside the self of a part of oneself” (Bataille, “Mutilation” 68).
If Bataille’s intellectual aim is to overcome Cartesian dualities and especially to
eliminate the self, we might think that a homogeneous relationship of body and world
would be desirable for him. But for Bataille, the appropriation that defines homogeneity
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is precisely the force behind the Cartesian system of dualities and its conception of a
discrete subject. The aim of the Cartesian subject is knowledge and possession of the
world, and through perceiving the world of objects it appropriates or consumes them.
Science and philosophy, according to Bataille, have sought to identify “all the elements
of which the world is composed,” or in other words to eat all the objects of the world,
digesting them down to their fundamental particles (Bataille, “de Sade” 96). The goal of
science and philosophy is “the establishment of the homogeneity of the world,” the
rationalization of all objects of perception (Bataille, “de Sade” 96). Within this world of
identical objects, the subject is paradoxically maintained: it eats but is not eaten. The
subject is the hungry self who indiscriminately consumes all objects, since they are
finally identical and interchangeable, exchangeable.
But all eating leads to excretion, and heterogeneity must follow homogeneity as
the analogous action of throwing a part of the self outside of the self. The gluttonous
homogeneity of the subject must “lead to a terminal phase in the sense of excretion when
the irreducible waste products of the operation are determined” (96). Presumably, this
refers to revolution. The waste products of personal homogeneity (excrement, gods,
cadavers, bodily fluids) are sacred by virtue of the act of sacrifice that expels them, sets
them apart. Likewise the waste products of social life must be expelled in rites that allow
the members of the society to free themselves from the stifling sameness of homogeneous
society.
These waste products are not interchangeable; they are not part of the buffet table
of edible objects Bataille says scientists and philosophers want to make of the world.
They are set apart, unique, sacred. When the shoe is removed from the body through the
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dissection and mutilation of art, framed and cropped, it becomes a kind of fetish that is
more than a fetish; it is a double of the body, an inorganic copy of the foot, but it is also a
part of the body, its constant companion in its wanderings. Perhaps the fetishist loves his
shoe the way Van Gogh loves his ear, and thus perhaps an image of shoe is like an image
of a severed foot. Nonetheless, shoes are separate from the body; we can take them off,
we can discard them without any harm to ourselves. But we soon have to put them on
again, reappropriate them, because we cannot do without them. In this sense they are
different even from an ear or a finger, which I can certainly live without. Shoes have a
humble sort of indispensability that is different from the vitality of the digestive organs or
the vulnerability of the eye.
The image of a shoe is not horrific in the same way as might be an image of an
isolated eye or mouth, both of which invoke a sense of violent ritual (fig. 3.12). It
suggests an abandoned carapace or perhaps a layer of skin shed by a molting snake; some
other shoe has surely replaced it, but it was once alive and inhabited. Roger Parry’s
photograph of a pile of abandoned trash, among it the bones of animals and partly
decomposed shoe, shows the similarity of a shoe and a bone—they are perhaps equally
important to a human’s functioning (fig. 3.13). The shallow arrangement of the objects,
all left behind and scattered on the dirty grass, suggests this. But our eye is drawn to the
shoe in this image. It occupies the upper half of the frame and is made of white canvas; it
is a woman’s shoe with a medium heel. Why is this shoe more suggestive of violence
than the jaw bone to its left? It looks decayed and mangled and the impression is that it
was ripped from someone’s foot, violently severed from her body. The body is contained
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Figure 3.12. Jacques-André Boiffard, Untitled, 1930, Published in Documents; rpt. in Rosalind E. Krauss,
L’amour fou: Photography and Surrealism (New York: Abbeville Press, 1985) 17.
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Figure 3.13. Roger Parry, Untitled, c. 1929, Private collection, New York; rpt. in Rosalind E. Krauss,
L’amour fou: Photography and Surrealism (New York: Abbeville Press, 1985) 24.
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in, coded by this shoe, in a way it wouldn’t be in an image of an abandoned hat. This
shoe is like a cadaver or a bone, the remnant of a body, except that it is made by, taken up
by that body; it is and always was in some sense an inanimate object. And yet…
The shoe is a fetish in the sense that it is a double of the foot, designed to protect
it from stimuli. But it is also a fetish in Bataille’s sense of an object possessing usevalue, a unique object that cannot be replaced because it is not specifically useful, just
valuable. But shoes surpass even this definition of fetish, because they adhere to the
body so closely; they follow and accompany its movements and retain its form so
completely that they become part of the body. It shares with the foot its ambiguous,
tortured character; it stands in for the foot in almost every situation; the foot may
consume the shoe, but the shoe consumes the foot right back. It is a part of the human
body, and yet not, and as such it is a heterogeneous element, and yet not. It is a part of
the body that is always severed from the body, always thrown from it in a sacrificial
mutilation. It is the foot’s constant companion and agent that nonetheless can never be
wholly appropriated by it. Just as the foot figured the collapse of the moral categories of
elevated/base, the shoe collapses the perceptive or epistemological categories of
body/world, subject/object; both have a role to play in achieving the “category that would
allow all categories to be unthought”: the informe (Krauss, L’Amour Fou 64).

Let us return to Magritte’s images of shoe/feet, because we can see them now
perhaps in a way that is informed by Bataille’s ideas (fig. 3.14). They are not fashionable
shoes; the image is not about the phantasmagoria of the new. They are rather objects that
are haunted by the bodies they have grown out of as carapaces, and when they are taken
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Figure 3.14. Rene Magritte, La philosophie dans le boudoir, 1947; rpt. in Waldberg, Patrick. René
Magritte, Trans. Austryn Wainhouse (Brussels: A. de Rache, 1965) 13.
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off they take part of that body with them in a kind of sacrificial mutilation. These are
fetishes in the sense that they span the boundary between body and object, not by being
eaten or used up by the body, but by acting as a prosthetic for the body, extending its
powers and binding it to its lack. These shoes imply feet and all the ambiguous humanity
feet possess. This painting is called La philosophie dans le boudoir, a title Magritte
derived from de Sade; the image shows how this sacrifice of these almost parts of the
body is a sacred act and the heterogeneous product of the appropriation that typifies
philosophy. In the boudoir, where body and object are joined not as eater and eaten but
in an embrace of equals, the strict categories of philosophy fall away. This erasing of the
self is the intoxication that the surrealists were seeking, the loss of the self while walking
through crowded city streets.
What we see here is evidence that the surrealists’ attitude towards objects of
everyday life was a complex one, contrary to Foster’s view. He insists that in modern art
and theory there was a “restrictive advocacy of resistance or acceleration” of
technological interaction with the body, and furthermore that this strict dilemma “marks a
structural limitation of both formations” (Foster 110). But if we see shoes as primitive,
originary technologies, inanimate objects that are joined to the body to extend its
activities, then we see that surrealist art acknowledges both sides of the double logic of
the prosthesis. In some of their work, particularly collages and the series of cadavre
exquis, the body may seem to be suffering the depredations of machines. But I am trying
to show that the surrealists were fundamentally comfortable with the idea of oneness
between the human body and the world of objects, which must include machines, and so
it would be excessive to characterize them as taking a stance that is entirely anxious with
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regard to technology’s effects on the body. If surrealist art portrays tortured, manipulated
bodies it is partly to express concern for the state of the body in modern life, but it is
more importantly an effort to achieve the informe. If bodies in surrealist art are severed
into parts, it is partly to express alienation, but it is more precisely a way of reaching the
sacred intoxication of self-mutilation.
And of course, the surrealists’ aims were fundamentally intellectual, social and
political, not psychological. They were certainly influenced by Freud, but they used his
ideas as tools to further their social program, not to work out their own neuroses. Telling
the dream of the modern world was one way of waking up from it. Benjamin says in the
introduction to his Arcades project that the eighteenth century “was incapable of
responding to the new technological possibilities with a new social order” and thus it left
“the last word…to the errant negotiator between old and new who are at the heart of these
phantasmagorias” (26). The failure to incorporate technology and the body in a
harmonious relation is not a psychological one or a cultural one or even an aesthetic one;
it is a social problem, and as such it has a social solution. Bataille would say that modern
society is too homogeneous; the greatest threat to its members is becoming machines in
the Marxist sense of being cogs in the machine of mass production than of being
physically overcome by technologies. The solution, or actually the inevitable result, will
be the ultimate purging of society’s heterogeneous elements; in a word, revolution.
So Foster’s claim that the surrealists took a stance against technology does not
acknowledge the fundamental intellectual and social goals of the movement, which were
to bring about intoxication and the informe as a way of hastening revolution. Their
anxiety about the body was founded more on the dualistic ideals that we tend to apply to
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it than to fears that it had or would suffer some trauma inflicted by machines (although
the traumas of World War I were certainly fresh in their minds). When they make
images of prostheses, or the body seeming to struggle with inorganic objects, they often
have a sense of humor to them, just as Bataille’s headless Acephalus “makes me laugh”
when I see him, because I meet him outside myself. These images of bodies morphing or
being substituted with objects convey the idea of freedom from the categories of
homogeneity. And when, as with Bellmer’s dolls, these images are more horrifying than
funny, this is also an escape from the self (some of Bellmer’s images are humorous,
though it’s a dark humor). The self in Bellmer’s images is fractured and broken, and its
shoes contribute to this, but this is just the kind of intoxication the surrealists were after.
Far from being opposed to technology, to inorganic objects becoming prostheses of the
body, the surrealists were seeking precisely for this loss of subjectivity in intoxication.
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Conclusion
I have been arguing that images of feet and shoes in surrealist art can be seen as
instances of bassesse, which is a mechanism proposed by Bataille for flattening
hierarchical structure in thought. These observations provide a framework in which to
read the images, but they also demonstrate the complexity of the surrealist project that
has perhaps been overlooked by figures like Foster and Jameson. Foster, for instance,
sees surrealism as one of a number of reactions to the enhanced role of technology as a
prosthesis for the body in the modern world, a reaction that simply sees these prostheses
as dangerous intrusions. I have tried to show that in the shoe, the surrealists found a
primitive technology that became one with the body and allow for the loss of the subject.
This disproves the idea of a categorical surrealist aversion to technology.
Jameson views surrealism as firmly committed to a high modernist Freudian
depth model, concerned primarily with liberating the unconscious and thereby preserving
the modernist vision of a monad-like subject. But what we see in Bataille’s ideas about
the informe is a fairly fully developed post-structuralist philosophy that seeks to flatten
all hierarchies in the loss of all categories of thought, and the foot gives us a fractured and
ambiguous idea of the human subject, and the shoe figures the loss of the subject in a
perpetual act of self-mutilation. Both Jameson and Foster are engaged in large narratives,
tracking the development of postmodernism and discussing modern views of the
relationship between the human body and technology respectively, and any phenomenon
loses some of its detail when we step back to look at it from a distance. Restoring some
of this detail through a close analysis can help us locate surrealism more accurately in the
space of transition from modernism to postmodernism.
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We can see in surrealist images of feet and shoes several tendencies that they
share with postmodernism. The nature of shoes as a commodity is an aspect of these
images I chose not to discuss in this project, but it is an important aspect of surrealist art
in general and of images of shoes in particular that links surrealism to postmodernism.
The boundaries between subject and object begin to break down in these images,
especially in Magritte’s paintings of shoe-feet, and this is evidence of the surrealists’
tendency to flatten hierarchies and depth models in a way that presages postmodernism.
The surrealists did hold on to their political and social motives, and thus they retained an
element of the Utopian character of modern art and thought, so it would be inaccurate to
characterize their production as fully postmodern, at least in Jameson’s view of the
postmodern. But further study could uncover the ways that shoes operated in mass
culture and commodity production at this time as well as the numerous and profound
links between surrealism and the fashion industry. In this way, we could begin to
understand more about how these early 20th century artists are precursors of an
“implicitly or explicitly political stance on the nature of multinational capitalism today,”
since such a stance is implied in “every position on postmodernism in culture,” according
to Jameson (3).3

3

How can a period of which we can say that its “whole global, yet American,
postmodern culture is the internal and superstructural expression of a whole new wave of
American military and economic domination throughout the world” also be a period
whose cultural production lacks any Utopian motivation, any ideological underpinnings
(Jameson 5)? If any position on postmodernism is also “and necessarily…a political
stance on the nature of multinational capitalism today,” then how can postmodernism
also be drained of political content? Perhaps this is the Lacanian schizophrenia of
postmodernity, or perhaps it is the paradox of a commentary about a system that itself
belongs to that system. At any rate, it seems likely that even surrealism’s political
agenda might not be sufficient as a bright line between it and postmodernism.
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We can see in these surrealist images of feet and shoes nascent treatments of what
will become important issues for the diverse productions of postmodern culture. Further
study could investigate the status of shoes as commodities during the early 20th century in
western Europe as well as the deep links between the surrealist movement and the fashion
industry, showing how both their textual production focused heavily on magazines. The
status of shoes as commodities that are literally intimately bound to the human body calls
up questions of deep links between cultural production and late capitalism; the closeness
of the relation between foot and shoe furthermore suggests the postmodern notion of
space and the collapse of distance, the “perceptual barrage of immediacy from which all
sheltering layers and intervening mediations have been removed,” also links them to
postmodern conceptions of space, including “Lefebvre’s concept of abstract space as
what is simultaneously homogeneous and fragmented” (Bellmer’s dolls come to mind;
Jameson 413).
Images of feet in surrealist art perform the function of radically rotating the
vertical axis of the human body and thereby challenge basic notions of morality and of
the existence of ideals such as elevated and base, good and evil. Images of shoes also
dissolve a boundary, this time the boundary drawn by traditional philosophy that
separates the rational, perceiving subject from the world of objects. These members of
the surrealist system of images have for some reason been neglected, both by the
surrealists themselves and by commentators on their products. Further study could reveal
the economic implications of shoes; the relationship between the surrealist movement and
the fashion industry is rich and full of possibilities for understanding better the exchange
of images between “high” surrealist art and “low” commercial art. I chose to gloss over
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the sexual and Freudian implications of feet and shoes, but more could be said on this
topic. In short, feet and shoes rest on very fertile ground that has yet to be tilled.
In an unpublished preface to his novel Le mort Bataille wrote about a real
experience that he reproduced in the novel (see Boiffard’s illustration, fig. 4.1). He was
in Normandy in 1942, recovering from a bout of tuberculosis, and out in the street one
day he saw a German plane go down. Approaching the wreckage he saw the bodies of
the dead German pilots:
The foot of one of the Germans was bared [dénudé], the sole of the shoe
having been torn away. The heads of the dead, it seems to me, were
shapeless. The flames must have touched them; this foot alone was intact.
It was the only human thing belonging to a body, and its nakedness,
having become earthen, was inhuman…in the upper with no sole of the
shoe, it was diabolical: but no, it was unreal, stripped naked [dénudé],
indecent to the highest degree. I remained motionless for a long time that
day, for this naked foot was looking at me. (qtd. in Finas 1-2)
The foot is the most human part of the body, for Bataille; the only thing that can make it
more human, more ambiguous, more troubled, is a shoe. And the final indecency, the
final fall from the skies, is to remove the shoe when the body is dead, revealing what
should have remained hidden: the fact that the foot, synecdoche for the whole human
body, is made of dust. Modern philosophy and science “has only one face: that of a
violent denial” of death in favor the mask of that which is visible, rational, knowable
(Finas 2). The naked foot of a dead body is the challenge to this system of thought
because it upends its order.
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Figure 4.1. Jacques-André Boiffard, Untitled, c. 1930, Collection Lucien Treillard, Paris; rpt. in Rosalind
E. Krauss, L’amour fou: Photography and Surrealism (New York: Abbeville Press, 1985) 20.
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